We evaluate the performance of two popular systemic risk measures, CoVaR and SRISK, during eight financial panics in the era before FDIC insurance. Bank stock price and balance sheet data were not readily available for this period. We rectify this shortcoming by constructing a novel dataset for the New York banking system before 1933. Our evaluation exercise focuses on two challenges: ranking systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and financial crisis prediction. We find that CoVaR and SRISK meet the SIFI ranking challenge. That is, they help identify systemic institutions in periods of distress beyond what is explained by standard risk measures up to six months before panics. In contrast, aggregate CoVaR and SRISK are only somewhat effective at predicting financial crises

Based on the twin sovereign-banking crisis nexus evolution of the Euro debt crisis era, we address the (volatility) mitigation of credit risk, measured by Credit Default Swap spreads (CDS) in both the banking and sovereign sectors within the Eurozone and the US/UK. Secondly, we highlight the volatility interconnectedness or the risk pass-through between sovereign-bank CDS markets with reference to the core vs. periphery EMU. Moreover, we identify the regime states of crises and recovery periods based on the bivariate CDS dynamic correlation series, categorized as the endogenous EMU sovereign risk coherence index. Finally, we investigate the “efficient” (parity) sovereign credit risk pricing during the post-crisis spillover period identified by the CDS and bond markets. We find heterogeneity between markets in pricing the sovereign risk in the regional tier (core-periphery EMU), emphasized by the absence of long-term association. Cointegration results are country-dependent as well as maturity-dependent. Empirical results reject the “no arbitrage” approach

We investigate the effects of the announcement and the disclosure of the clarification, methodology, and outcomes of the U.S. banking stress tests on banks’ equity prices, credit risk, systematic risk, and systemic risk. We find evidence that stress tests have moved stock and credit markets following the disclosure of stress test results. We also find that banks’ systematic risk, as measured by betas, declined in nearly all years after the publication of stress test results. Our evidence suggests that stress tests affect systemic risk

We investigate whether and how the uniqueness of banking activities affects the performance and systemic risk of U.S. banks. We find that banks performing more unique activities exhibit higher profitability and lower risk, controlling for size, diversification, and other key characteristics. We further find that banks’ sensitivity to systemic risk displays an inversely U-shaped relation with activity uniqueness. We interpret the impact of uniqueness in analogy to recent theories showing that systemic diversity promotes financial stability. Our study highlights the role of uniqueness in banking and has important implications for policy makers and banking regulators

Countries that have experienced occasional financial crises have, on average, grown faster than countries with stable financial conditions. Because financial crises are realizations of downside risk, we measure their incidence by the skewness of credit growth. Unlike variance, negative skewness isolates the impact of the large, infrequent, and abrupt credit busts associated with crises. We find a robust negative link between skewness and GDP growth in a large sample of countries over 1960–2000. This suggests a positive effect of systemic risk on growth. To explain this finding, we present a model in which contract enforceability problems generate borrowing constraints and impede growth. In financially liberalized economies with moderate contract enforceability, systemic risk taking is encouraged and increases investment. This leads to higher mean growth but also to greater incidence of crises. In the data, the link between skewness and growth is indeed strongest in such economies

To capture systemic risk related to network structures, this paper introduces a measure that complements direct exposures with common exposures, as well as compares these to each other. Trying to address the interconnected nature of financial systems, researchers have recently proposed a range of approaches for assessing network structures. Much of the focus is on direct exposures or market-based estimated networks, yet little attention has been given to the multivariate nature of systemic risk, indirect exposures and overlapping portfolios. In this regard, we rely on correlation network models that tap into the multivariate network structure, as a viable means to assess common exposures and complement direct linkages. Using BIS data, we compare correlation networks with direct exposure networks based upon conventional network measures, as well as we provide an approach to aggregate these two components for a more encompassing measure of interconnectedness

[First paragraph] The worldwide financial crisis (WFC) of 2007-09 has shown the importance of cross-sectional dependencies of assets, credit exposures and volatility, which can threaten domestic and global financial stability through cascades in financial networks. A correct assessment of company-specific risk has to account for the potential risk spillover effects from other firms (Hautsch et al. 2014). This is because of the intertwined nature of financial markets, which allow the spread of risk throughout the system (Acemoglu et al., 2015). The potential impact of interconnected financial institutions on the entire financial system has been a financial stability concern for central banks and regulators. The need for economic foundations for a systemic risk measure is more than an academic concern since it involves regulators, supervisory authorities and policy-makers (Acharya et al. 2017). This special issue provides a substantial contribution to the systemic risk literature

This study investigates the implications of cross-country differences in banking regulation and supervision for the international subsidiary locations and risk of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs). We find that BHCs are more likely to operate subsidiaries in countries with weaker regulation and supervision and that such location decisions are associated with elevated BHC risk and higher contribution to systemic risk. The quality of BHCs’ internal controls and risk management plays an important role in these location choices and risk outcomes. Overall, our study suggests that U.S. banking organizations engage in cross-country regulatory arbitrage, with potentially adverse consequences

We introduce a top-down no-arbitrage model for pricing structured products. Losses are described by Cox processes whose intensities depend on economic variables. The model provides economic insight into the impact of structured products on financial institutions’ risk exposure and systemic risk. We estimate the model using CDO data and find that spreads decrease with higher interest rates and increase with volatility and leverage. Volatility is the primary determinant of variation in tranche spreads. Leverage and interest rates are more closely associated with rare credit events. Model-implied risk premiums and the probabilities of tranche losses increase substantially during the financial crisis

The tax benefit of interest deductibility encourages debt financing, but regulatory constraints create dependency between bank leverage and asset risk. Using a large international sample of banks this paper shows that banks located in high-tax countries have higher leverage and lower average asset risk-weights. This trade-off is stronger when regulation is more stringent and for banks with less capital. Non-financial firms' leverage and asset risk are positively related to tax rates, as further evidence of the regulatorily induced adjustment of portfolio risk. A difference-in-difference analysis provides support for a causal interpretation of these results. Overall, higher tax rates are positively correlated with systemic risk, suggesting that the lower asset risk does not offset the risk-inducing effect of tax rates on bank leverage