Knowledge that Transforms

We construct a dynamic integrated assessment model of climate and the economy with very high geographic resolution. Migration is free within, but not allowed across, countries. The model parameterization uses a wealth of data, including the distribution of output, population, energy sources and use, and estimates of the local damages from climate change. It implies very large geographic dispersion in damages from warming. We conduct three kinds of policy experiments. In one, we note that a modest, uniform carbon tax limits global warming and damages around the world substantially. In a second experiment, we let the poorest countries not tax carbon, while the rest compensate by setting higher taxes; the efficiency losses are large. In a final experiment, we find that fast green technology growth alone is a poor substitute for carbon taxes, whether globally available or not.

We consider impulse response inference in a locally misspecified vector autoregression (VAR) model. The conventional local projection (LP) confidence interval has correct coverage even when the misspecification is so large that it can be detected with probability approaching 1. This result follows from a “double robustness” property analogous to that of popular partially linear regression estimators. By contrast, the conventional VAR confidence interval with short‐to‐moderate lag length can severely undercover for misspecification that is small, difficult to detect statistically, and cannot be ruled out based on economic theory. The VAR confidence interval has robust coverage if, and only if, the lag length is so large that the interval is as wide as the LP interval.

Customs data reveal the heterogeneity and granularity of relationships among buyers and sellers, showing how more exports to a destination break down into more firms selling there and more buyers per exporter. We develop a quantitative general equilibrium model of firm‐to‐firm matching that builds on this insight to separate the roles of iceberg costs and matching frictions in gravity. In the cross section, we find matching frictions as important as iceberg costs in impeding trade, and more sensitive to distance. Because domestic and imported intermediates compete directly with labor in performing production tasks, our model also fits the heterogeneity of labor shares across French producers. Applying the framework to the 2004 expansion of the European Union, reduced iceberg costs and reduced matching frictions contributed equally to the increase in French exports to the new members. While workers benefited overall, those competing most directly with imports gained less, even losing in some countries entering the EU.

We consider a dynamic buyer–seller interaction. Instead of the buyer's valuation, it is the frequency with which he needs to trade that is the buyer's private information. The difference matters. With commitment, full surplus extraction is possible, for instance via limited‐time offers. Without commitment, ratcheting is mitigated, as not buying is not necessarily a sign of strength. Because time is informative, the seller learns and may adjust her behavior over time. When finding a suitable alternative seller is easy, she starts with a pooling offer before permanently switching to a screening offer. When finding a suitable alternative seller takes time, she starts with a pooling offer before occasionally experimenting with separating offers.

The U.S. Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission deregulated campaign finance, enabling the rise of a new political action committee (the Super PAC) with broad freedom to raise and spend money. This led to an unprecedented surge in spending in primary and general elections. To evaluate the impact of Super PACs, I estimate a multistage model of political competition using data from U.S. Congressional elections between 2010 and 2020. I find that Super PAC spending by both sides prompts offsetting responses, resulting in limited net equilibrium effects. However, by amplifying the role of donors, Super PACs still have the potential to reshape the electoral landscape.

This paper explores the impact of information design on the auctioneer's revenue in the U.S. offshore oil/gas lease auctions where, post‐auction, the winner decides whether to explore the auctioned tract and must pay the government a royalty on its production value. I first document that there is a positive correlation between the exploration rate and publicly observed losing bids. This suggests that the winning bidder uses the rivals' bids to infer their private information about the tract's potential. I then characterize the equilibrium bidding strategy when the auctioneer designs and commits to how to reveal information on losing bids to the winning bidder. Counterfactual exercises reveal that alternative bid disclosure policies significantly improve auctioneer revenue.

Evidence from the laboratory and the field has uncovered both underreaction and overreaction to new information. We provide new experimental evidence on the underlying mechanisms of under‐ and overreaction by comparing how people make inferences and revise forecasts in the same information environment. Participants underreact to signals when inferring about underlying states, but overreact to the same signals when revising forecasts about future outcomes—a phenomenon we term “the inference‐forecast gap.” We show that this gap is largely driven by different simplifying heuristics used in the two tasks. Additional treatments suggest that the choice of heuristics is affected by the similarity between statistics in the information environment and the statistic elicited by the belief‐updating problem.

ABSTRACT Despite the growing use of subjective performance incentives used in executive bonuses, empirical evidence on their effectiveness remains inconclusive. This study explores three aspects of subjective metrics in bonus plan design: their prevalence, the goals they target, and their impact on managerial behavior and firm outcomes. First, I document 53.8 percent of CEO bonus plans include at least one subjective performance measure, and among these plans, an average of 38.9 percent of total bonus weight is allocated to these measures. Using machine learning, I show subjective metrics target incentives related to employees, firm culture, and executive performance. Second, using the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act as a quasi-exogenous shock to contract design, I find firms increase the number and weight of subjective metrics by 22.9 percent and 10.4 percent, respectively. Finally, I find the increasing prevalence of subjective performance measures positively influences CEO effort, corporate culture, and innovation. Data Availability: The data used in this study are from public sources and available upon request. JEL Classifications: M12; J33; G38; M41; H2.

ABSTRACT Technological advances are reshaping the business landscape, yet their use in financial reporting has been slow. We develop a model in which auditors and companies make technology investment decisions and examine their impact on audit fees and outcomes. Our analysis shows that auditors and companies may fail to invest in mutually beneficial technology that would enhance audit quality, resulting in coordination failure. We also demonstrate how legal liability, client business risk, and auditor pricing power affect the conditions under which such coordination failure occurs. Furthermore, technology investments can either increase or decrease audit fees. When companies can choose among projects with varying risk levels, technology investments can increase audit failure risk while improving welfare by enabling them to pursue riskier but more profitable projects. Our results provide a rationale for regulatory intervention to facilitate technology investments in the financial reporting environment and offer empirical predictions. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; M48.