N 1970 Baumol, Heim, Malkiel, and Quandt (hereinafter BHMQ) published a provocative article. Their hypothesis was that for U.S. firms the rate of return from invested funds would be greatest when the financing involved the most serious exercise of market discipline. On these grounds they conjectured that borrowing would tend to produce significant increases in earnings but not as great as those associated with new stock issues, and that the rate of return to plowback would be the lowest of the three. BHMQ's empirical tests led them to the following conclusions:

Violations of the absolute priority rule (APR) are commonplace in private workouts, formal business reorganizations, and personal bankruptcies. While some theorists suggest they may arise endogenously, they are clearly magnified by the institutional structure of the bankruptcy code. This paper shows that APR violations exacerbate credit rationing problems by reducing the payment lenders receive in default states. Furthermore, APR violations make default more likely to occur, thereby making debt financing more costly. Together, these results support the view that APR violations create an impediment to efficient financial contracting.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: G33, G38, K20.

A model with private information that supports conventional arguments for a government monopoly in supplying circulating media of exchange is constructed. The model also yields rate-of-return and velocity predictions which are consistent with observations from free banking regimes and fiat money regimes. In a laissezfaire banking equilibrium, fiat money is (essentially) not valued, and the resulting allocation is not Pareto optimal. However, if private agents are restricted from issuing circulating notes, there exists an equilibrium with valued fiat money that Pareto dominates the laissez-faire equilibrium and is Pareto optimal within a restricted class of allocations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 020, 310.

If democracy is to have any of the good effects said to justify it, it must be self-enforcing. Those who control the government must choose to hold regular, competitive elections for the highest offices, and all parties must be willing to comply with the results. I consider simple models of electoral accountability along the lines of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986), but allowing rulers to chose whether to hold elections and citizens whether to rebel or protest. When individuals privately observe a signal of government’s performance (e.g., their own welfare), they face a difficult problem of how to coordinate to pose a credible threat of rebellion necessary to induce the ruler to provide public goods. The convention of holding elections according to a known schedule and rules can provide a public signal for coordinating rebellion in the event that elections are suspended or blatantly rigged, while the elections themselves aggregate private observations of performance. Two threats to this solution to political moral hazard are also considered. First, when the ruling faction controls the army, it may prefer to fight rather step down after losing an election, and ex post transfers may be incredible. A party system where parties can return to office in the future is shown to be able to restore self-enforcing democracy, though at the expense of weaker electoral control. Second, subtle or piecemeal electoral fraud may undermine the ability of the citizens to credibly threaten the opposition that maintains elections. I show that when there are organizations in society that can privately (though noisily) observe and announce fraud or the state of popular discontent (such as an opposition party), under some conditions the incumbent prefers to commit to fair elections over an “accountable autocratic ” equilibrium in which public goods are provided but costly rebellions periodically occur. 1

This article analyzes the effect of competition on a supermarket firm's incentive to provide product quality. In the supermarket industry, product availability is an important measure of quality. Using U.S. Consumer Price Index microdata to track inventory shortfalls, I find that stores facing more intense competition have fewer shortfalls. Competition from Walmart—the most significant shock to industry market structure in half a century—decreased shortfalls among large chains by about a third. The risk that customers will switch stores appears to provide competitors with a strong incentive to invest in product quality.

I use microeconomic estimates of the effect of health on individual outcomes to construct macroeconomic estimates of the proximate effect of health on GDP per capita. I employ a variety of methods to construct estimates of the return to health, which I combine with cross-country and historical data on height, adult survival rates, and age at menarche. Using my preferred estimate, eliminating health differences among countries would reduce the variance of log GDP per worker by 9.9 percent and reduce the ratio of GDP per worker at the 90th percentile to GDP per worker at the lOth percentile from 20.5 to 17.9. While this effect is economically significant, it is also substantially smaller than estimates of the effect of health on economic growth that are derived from cross-country regressions.

The majority of U. S. temporary help supply (THS) firms offer nominally free, unrestricted computer skills training, a practice inconsistent with the competitive model of training. I propose and test a model in which firms offer general training to induce self-selection and perform screening of worker ability. The model implies, and the data confirm, that firms providing training attract higher ability workers yet pay them lower wages after training. Thus, beyond providing spot market labor, THS firms sell information about worker quality to their clients. The rapid growth of THS employment suggests that demand for worker screening is rising.

Simultaneity between prisoner populations and crime rates makes it difficult to isolate the causal effect of changes in prison populations on crime. To break that simultaneity, this paper uses prison overcrowding litigation in a state as an instrument for changes in the prison population. The resulting elasticities are two to three times greater than those of previous studies. A one-prisoner reduction is associated with an increase of fifteen Index I crimes per year. While calculations of the costs of crime are inherently uncertain, it appears that the social benefits associated with crime reduction equal or exceed the social costs of incarceration for the marginal prisoner.

How does movement toward freer trade affect income disparity among countries? This paper attempts to shed some light on the issue by examining episodes of major postwar trade hberalization within specified groups of countries. The findings suggest a strong link between the timing of trade reform and income convergence among countries.

A simple real linear-quadratic inventory model is used to determine how cost and demand shocks interacted to cause fluctuations in aggregate inventories and GNP in the United States, 1947–1986. Cost shocks appear to be the predominant source of fluctuations in inventories and are largely, though not exclusively, responsible for the fact that GNP is more variable than final sales. Cost and demand shocks are of roughly equal importance for GNP. These estimates, however, are imprecise. With different, but plausible, values for a certain target inventory-sales ratio, cost shocks are less important than demand shocks for GNP fluctuations.