Knowledge that Transforms

The Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) valuation model provides a rigorous framework for summarizing the information in expected future earnings and book values. However, the model provides little guidance on selecting an empirical proxy for expected future earnings. We examine whether and under what circumstances historical earnings and analyst earnings forecasts offer comparable explanation of security prices. This issue is of particular interest because analyst forecasts are less readily available than historical data. Under appropriate circumstances, historical data may allow wider use of the Feltham‐Ohlson valuation model by researchers and investors. A related issue is the incremental explanatory power of historical earnings and realized future earnings (perfect‐foresight forecasts) for security prices beyond analyst forecasts. If historical earnings are incrementally informative, that would suggest that analyst forecasts do not fully reflect price‐relevant information in past earnings. If future earnings are incrementally informative, that would suggest that security prices reflect investors' implicit earnings forecasts beyond analyst forecasts. We examine these issues using a historical model (based on past earnings), a perfect‐foresight model (based on realized future earnings), and a forecast model (based on Value Line earnings forecasts). All three models provide significant explanatory power for security prices, and each set of earnings data provides incremental explanatory power for prices when used with the other sets of earnings data. We estimate the models separately for firms with moderate and extreme earnings‐to‐price (E/P) ratios, a proxy for earnings permanence. For moderate‐E/P firms, the historical model's explanatory power exceeds that of the perfect foresight model, and is indistinguishable from that of the analyst forecast model. In contrast, for extreme‐E/P firms, the perfect‐foresight model offers greater explanatory power than the historical model, but lower explanatory power than analyst forecasts. Our results suggest that financial analysts' forecasting efforts are best focused on firms whose earnings contain large temporary components (extreme E/P firms). However, in general, both historical data and analyst forecasts are complementary information sources for security valuation.

We investigate capital investment problems when a manager knows the costs of a set of available projects, while the owner only holds probabilistic beliefs about these costs. With mutually exclusive projects, an optimal policy can be defined by a series of cost targets, one for each of the possible projects. The project with the lowest reported cost relative to the target is chosen, and funded as if the cost were equal to the target. The optimal investment policy can deviate from a traditional policy of selecting the project with the highest, positive net present value (NPV) in a number of ways. First, under‐investment arises to limit the manager's ability to capture the economic rents. Second, when investment takes place, it is not always the project with the highest NPV that is implemented. Third, projects with lower cost variability can be favored. We extend the analysis to non‐mutually exclusive projects. With two independent projects, batch processing is superior to individual appraisal whenever both optimal individual appraisal cost targets are interior. Individual appraisal ignores the impact of individual targets on incentives to report the costs of other potential projects. Batch processing can improve individual assessment by cost effective switching of investment away from the individual projects and into the batch as a whole. The results suggest that the common practice of analyzing batches of capital requests in an annual capital budgeting cycle provides advantages in the organization's attempt to deal with asymmetric information and incentive problems.

This paper investigates the relation between industry‐wide information disclosures by the trade association for the semiconductor industry and both share prices and analyst forecasts. Such disclosures may have little impact on investors and analysts, since prior theoretical research suggests that trade associations may be unable to secure reliable data from firms in an industry. At the same time, such disclosures may be important, since prior empirical research suggests that share prices and analyst forecasts reflect industry‐wide earnings effects earlier than firm‐specific effects. We document significant stock price movements on release dates of industry Flash Reports by the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) each month that contain aggregate industry data on new orders and shipments. The magnitude of the price revisions on Flash Report disclosure dates is positively associated with changes in the numbers disclosed and varies across sample firms in a manner associated with identifiable characteristics of the firms. Further tests indicate that the Flash Report provides mainly forward‐looking information on new orders that is linked to firm‐specific sales changes and has explanatory power for quarterly stock prices beyond firm‐specific earnings. This information is used by security analysts mainly in assessing the persistence of firm‐specific quarterly sales changes. Our findings support the hypothesis that the SIA is able to obtain data from firms, compile it into reliable aggregate statistics, and then distribute these statistics in a timely fashion.

Previous empirical research on the informativeness of earnings has focused on stockholders, and has not examined differences in earnings' informativeness for stockholders and bondholders. Because stockholders are residual claimants and bondholders are fixed claimants, the informativeness of earnings should differ for these two types of investors. When a firm's default risk is low, changes in its financial condition should be of limited relevance to bondholders, but should be relevant to stockholders. In contrast, as the likelihood of financial distress increases, stockholders' limited liability allows them to abandon the firm to the bondholders (Fischer and Verrecchia 1997). Accordingly, as a firm's default risk increases, changes in its financial condition should be increasingly important to bondholders and less important to shareholders. Because earnings provide information on firm value, the stock return‐earnings association should decrease as the firm's financial strength declines, while the bond return‐earnings association should increase. We use two measures of a firm's financial strength: the firm's bond rating and its reporting of a loss. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that the association between stock returns and changes in annual earnings decreases as bond ratings decline, while the association between bond returns and changes in annual earnings increases. These results suggest that as the company's financial condition deteriorates, earnings become less relevant for stock valuation and more relevant for bond valuation. When we partition firms based on their loss status, we find a stronger association between stock returns and annual earnings changes for firms with positive earnings (profit firms) than for firms with losses, consistent with earlier studies. In contrast, we find that the association between bond returns and earnings changes is greater for loss firms than for profit firms. These results suggest that losses reduce the informativeness of earnings for stockholders but increase informativeness for bondholders, suggesting that investors view losses as indicating increased credit risk.