We identify the international credit channel by exploiting Mexican supervisory data sets and foreign monetary policy shocks in a country with a large presence of European and U.S. banks. A softening of foreign monetary policy expands credit supply of foreign banks (e.g., U.K. policy affects credit supply in Mexico via U.K. banks), inducing strong firm‐level real effects. Results support an international risk‐taking channel and spillovers of core countries’ monetary policies to emerging markets, both in the foreign monetary softening part (with higher credit and liquidity risk‐taking by foreign banks) and in the tightening part (with negative local firm‐level real effects).

We study the credit supply effects of the unexpected freeze of the European interbank market, using exhaustive Portuguese loan-level data. We find that banks that rely more on interbank borrowing before the crisis decrease their credit supply more during the crisis. The credit supply reduction is stronger for firms that are smaller, with weaker banking relationships. Small firms cannot compensate the credit crunch with other sources of debt. Furthermore, the impact of illiquidity on the credit crunch is stronger for less solvent banks. Finally, we find no overall positive effects of central bank liquidity but instead higher hoarding of liquidity.

We show that bank shocks to firms propagate along the production network with stronger upstream than downstream effects. Our identification relies on (i) administrative datasets from Spain covering supplier-customer transactions and bank loans, (ii) bank credit supply shocks from the global financial crisis, and (iii) a general equilibrium model of a production network with financial frictions, estimated structurally. We find network propagation amplifies the impact of bank shocks on GDP growth by nearly 50 percent. Moreover, bank shocks to firms’ distant suppliers and customers contribute similarly to this aggregate effect as bank shocks to firms’ direct customers and suppliers.

We show that FX interventions can be effective, particularly in attenuating global financial spillovers. We exploit global financial shocks and Brazilian central bank interventions in FX derivatives using three matched administrative registers: bank credit (to firms), foreign credit to banks, and employer‐employees. After the U.S. Taper Tantrum (followed by emerging markets' FX turbulence), Brazilian banks with more foreign debt cut credit supply, reducing firm‐level employment. A subsequent large policy intervention supplying derivatives against FX risks — hedger of last resort — halved the negative effects. A 2008 to 2015 panel exploiting global FX shocks and local FX interventions confirms the results and the hedging channel. However, the FX policy entails fiscal and moral hazard costs.

We analyze the distributional effects of monetary policy on income, wealth, and consumption. We use administrative household‐level data covering the entire population in Denmark over the period 1987 to 2014 and exploit a long‐standing currency peg as a source of exogenous variation in monetary policy. We find that gains from softer monetary policy in terms of income, wealth, and consumption are monotonically increasing in ex ante income. The distributional effects reflect systematic differences in exposure to the various channels of monetary policy, especially nonlabor channels (e.g., leverage and risky assets). Our estimates imply that softer monetary policy increases income inequality.

We show that negative interest rate policy (NIRP) has expansionary effects on credit supply through a portfolio rebalancing channel. By shifting down and flattening the yield curve, NIRP differs from rate cuts just above the zero-lower-bound and has effects similar to QE. For identification, we exploit ECB’s NIRP and the Italian credit register and, for external validity, European and U.S. datasets. NIRP affects more banks with higher ex-ante liquid assets, including net interbank positions. More exposed banks reduce liquid assets, expand credit supply, especially to financially-constrained firms, and cut loan rates, inducing firms to increase investment and the wage bill.

We analyze securities trading by banks during the crisis and the associated spillovers to the supply of credit. We use a proprietary data set that has the investments of banks at the security level for 2005–2012 in conjunction with the credit register from Germany. We find that—during the crisis—banks with higher trading expertise (trading banks) increase their investments in securities, especially in those that had a larger price drop, with the strongest impact in low-rated and long-term securities. Moreover, trading banks reduce their credit supply, and the credit crunch is binding at the firm level. All of the effects are more pronounced for trading banks with higher capital levels. Finally, banks use central bank liquidity and government subsidies like public recapitalization and implicit guarantees mainly to support trading of securities. Overall, our results suggest an externality arising from fire sales in securities markets on credit supply via the trading behavior of banks.