Abstract We analyze the impact of a requirement similar to the Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio on the bank intermediation applying Regression Discontinuity Designs. Using a unique dataset on Dutch banks, we show that a liquidity requirement causes long-term borrowing and lending rates as well as demand for long-term interbank loans to increase. Lower levels of aggregate liquidity increase the estimated effects. Short-term borrowing and lending rates only rise during periods of lower market-wide liquidity. Further, banks do not seem able to pass on the increased funding costs in the interbank market to their private sector clients. Rather, a liquidity requirement seems to decrease banks’ interest margins.

I examine three composite analyst forecast of earnings per share as proxies for expected earnings. The most current forecast weakly dominates the mean and median forecasts in accuracy. This is evidence that forecast dates are more relevant for determining accuracy than individual error. Consistent with previous research, I find analysts more accurate than time-series models. However prior knowledge of forecast errors from a quarterly autoregressive model predicts excess stock returns better than prior knowledge of analysts' errors. This is inconsistent with previous research, and is anomalous given analysts' greater accuracy.

Abstract. I examine how an internal auditor, called the firm, designs a control system for a strategic employee who conditions his thefts on the amount and types of controls. Society sets minimum testing amounts and fines for detected theft, whereas the firm determines the employee's wages and the amount of monitoring above the minimum. The results fall into three separate cases. When society's minimum testing standards and fines are sufficiently high, the employee never steals in any period. In this case, the firm performs the minimum amount of testing and pays the lowest feasible wage. In the remaining two cases, the testing standard and fines are too low to prevent theft by themselves. In these two cases the firm's control system determines whether there will be theft in the first period. I show that if the firm chooses to prevent all first‐period theft, then it uses only one type of control. She offers a wage premium and monitors the minimum amount. The wage premium substitutes for a tine large enough to prevent all theft. If the firm designs controls that do not prevent all theft, then the firm also uses only one control. In contrast to the no‐theft case, the firm pays the lowest feasible wage and monitors above the minimum. This choice reflects the increasing returns to scale of monitoring in preventing theft.

Much of the comparative economic history of the nineteenth century focuses on the spread of the Industrial Revolution from Britain. Incomes converged, in this view, as the transfer of superior technology raised incomes in the periphery. In Globalization and History, Kevin O'Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson challenge this technological approach, arguing that neoclassical effects of trade and factor supply changes provide more insight. Increased trade, stimulated by falling transportation costs, and factor movements caused prices of locally scarce factors to fall and promoted factor price convergence.

My colleagues at Williams, especially Thomas McCoy, James Halstead, Thomas Tietenberg, and Donald Keesing, gave me invaluable criticism on this paper. At an earlier stage, Mark Perlman 's comments were particularly helpful as were those of Roger Bolton, Stephen Lewis, William Gates, Helen Hughes, Earl McFarland and Francisco Thoumi. A Ford Foundation grant (720-0234), the Williams College Center for Development Economics and the World Bank Capital Utilization Research Project made important contributions to this work. Opinions and errors of fact or interpretation are, of course, all mine.