Changes in the capital gains tax rules facing individual investors do not affect the incentives for “window dressing” by institutional investors, but they can affect the incentives for year‐end tax–induced trading by individual investors. Empirical evidence for the 1963 to 1996 period suggests that when the tax law encouraged taxable investors who accrued losses early in the year to realize their losses before year‐end, the correlation between early year losses and turn‐of‐the‐year returns was weaker than when the law did not provide such an early realization incentive. These findings suggest that tax‐loss trading contributes to turn‐of‐the‐year return patterns.

This paper uses British data to examine the effects of dividend taxes on investors' relative valuation of dividends and capital gains. British data offer great potential to illuminate the dividends and taxes question, since there have been two radical changes and several minor reforms in British dividend tax policy during the last 30 years. Studying the relationship between dividends and stock price movements during different tax regimes offers an ideal controlled experiment for assessing the effects of taxes on investors' valuation of dividends. Using daily data on a small sample of firms, and monthly data on a much broader sample, we find clear evidence that taxes affect the equilibrium relationship between dividend yields and market returns. These findings suggest that taxes are important determinants of security market equilibrium and deepen the puzzle of why firms pay dividends.

This paper explores the relationship between the after-tax returns that taxable investors earn on equity mutual funds and the subsequent cash inflows to these funds. Previous studies have documented that funds with high pretax returns attract greater inflows. This paper presents evidence, based on a large sample of retail equity mutual funds over the period 1993–1999, that after-tax returns have more explanatory power than pretax returns in explaining inflows. In addition, funds with large overhangs of unrealized capital gains experience smaller inflows, all else equal, than funds without such unrealized gains. A large capital gain overhang discourages both gross fund inflows and gross outflows, but the inflow effect dominates the outflow effect.

Specialists in labor economics and public economics at 40 leading research universities provided opinions of policy proposals, quantitative best estimates and 95-percent confidence intervals for economic parameters, and answers to values questions regarding income redistribution, efficiency versus equity, and individual versus social responsibility. Their positions on policy are more closely related to their values than to their estimates of relevant economic parameters. Average best estimates of the economic parameters agree well with the relevant literature, but individual best estimates are usually widely dispersed. The individual 95-percent confidence intervals are much narrower than the substantial cross-respondent variation in estimates would warrant.

We use a unique data set of annuities in the United Kingdom to test for adverse selection. We find systematic relationships between ex post mortality and annuity characteristics, such as the timing of payments and the possibility of payments to the annuitant's estate. These patterns are consistent with the presence of asymmetric information. However, we find no evidence of substantive mortality differences by annuity size. These results suggest that the absence of selection on one contract dimension does not preclude its presence on others. This highlights the importance of considering detailed features of insurance contracts when testing theoretical models of asymmetric information.

Contributions to 401(k) plans are now the most important form of retirement saving. Since 401(k) plans were introduced in the early 1980’s, they have expanded rapidly and continuously. By 1998, roughly half of all households were eligible to participate in 401(k) plans, and more than 36 million workers made contributions to these employer-provided saving plans. In 1995, the last year for which the U.S. Department of Labor has released definitive data, 401(k) contributions amounted to $87.4 billion, or 55 percent of all contributions to employer-sponsored pension plans. The level of contributions, and their share of all pension contributions, is probably significantly higher today. The spread of 401(k) plans is the most important indicator of the move to personal retirement saving. In 1980, almost 92 percent of pension-plan contributions were to traditional employer-provided plans, and about 64 percent of these contributions were to conventional defined-benefit plans. Today, almost 60 percent of contributions are to personal retirement accounts, including 401(k), IRA, and Keogh plans. Including employerprovided, non-401(k) defined-contribution plans, over 76 percent of contributions are to plans that are controlled in large measure by individuals. These individuals make participation, contribution, asset-allocation, and withdrawal decisions. In this paper, we describe the likely importance of 401(k) assets for future older Americans and the effect of investment decisions on asset accumulation. We also examine the extent to which retirement assets may be affected by several decisions: preretirement withdrawals, management fees and expenses, contribution rates, and early retirement. Our analysis focuses on 401(k) saving, but applies more broadly to other forms of individual retirement saving.