In this paper, we look at how the pre-crisis health of banks is related to the probability of receiving and repaying TARP capital. We find that financial performance characteristics that are related to the probability of receiving TARP funds differ for the healthiest (“over-achiever”) versus the least healthy (“under-achiever”) banks. We find that TARP under-achievers have some, but not consistent, weaknesses in income production. These banks also are experiencing liquidity issues as customers, shut out of public debt markets, get bank loans through drawdowns of loan commitments. Unlike TARP under-achievers, TARP over-achievers’ loans are performing well. Yet, liquidity issues (from low levels of liquid assets and core deposits and drawdowns of loan commitments) hurt the abilities of these banks to continue their lending. Differences between under-achiever and over-achiever banks are also found for repayment and deadbeat TARP banks.

Earnings smoothing via accounting discretion could improve or garble actual earnings information. Although managers prefer a less volatile earnings path and perceive lower risk for earnings smoothness, prior studies show that there is no discernible relation between smoothness and firm valuation. Recent literature documents that socially responsible firms behave differently from other firms in their earnings management and financial reporting. We conjecture that the reported earnings of smoothers that are socially responsible deviate less from their permanent earnings, thus their reported earnings are more value relevant. Our empirical tests show income-smoothing firms with higher corporate social responsibility (CSR) experience higher contemporaneous earnings-return relationship, greater Tobin’s Q, and stronger current return-future earnings relationship. The results show that CSR is proved desirable as it adds a unique “quality dimension” to earnings attributes and is useful for firm valuation.

We study the impact of “style investing” on the market for corporate control. We argue that the choice of the bidder is influenced by the fact that the merge with a firm that belongs to an investment style more popular with the market may boost the bidder's value. By using data on the flows in mutual funds, we construct a measure of popularity, which relies directly on the identification of sentiment-induced investor demand, rather than being a direct transformation of stock market data. We show that differences in popularity between bidder and target help to explain their pairing. The merger with a more popular target generates a halo effect from the target to the bidder that induces the market to evaluate the assets of the less popular bidder at the (inflated) market value of the more popular target. Both bidder and target premiums are positively related to the difference in popularity between the target and the bidder. However, the target's ability to appropriate the gain is reduced by the fact that its bargaining position is weaker when the bidder's potential for asset appreciation is higher. We document a better short- and medium-term performance of less popular firms taking over more popular firms. The bidder managers engaging in these cosmetic mergers take advantage of the window of opportunity induced by the deal to reduce their stake in the firm under convenient conditions.

Competitive threats motivate firms to use convertible debt because the possibility of future conversion enhances financial flexibility. Consistent with this intuition, we find that the intensity of competitive threats is positively associated with convertible debt financing at both the extensive and intensive margins. By using large tariff reductions as exogenous shocks to competition we show that this relation is likely causal. Convertible debt usage in response to competitive threats strongly depends on a firm’s relative financial and competitive conditions. In addition, firms increase the probability of future conversion by tailoring convertible debt features.

Exploiting demand shocks from changes in federal government spending, we examine how the organizational structure of a firm affects its investment behavior. Government spending shocks affect the investment of government-dependent conglomerate segments less than matched stand-alone firms. Investment also increases in lower government-dependent segments when other segments within the same firm experience positive demand shocks, indicating cross-subsidization between segments. We further show that this cross-subsidization leads to worse operating performance and increases the diversification discount. Our findings are robust after addressing the endogeneity of government spending.

We analyze the bank supply of credit under the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). The literature emphasizes relationships as a means to improve lender information, which helps banks manage credit risk. Despite imposing no risk, however, the PPP supply reflects traditional measures of relationship lending: decreasing in bank size and increasing in prior experience, commitment lending, and core deposits. Our results suggest a new benefit of bank relationships: They help firms access government-subsidized lending. Consistent with this benefit, we show that the bank PPP supply, based on the structure of the local banking sector, alleviates increases in unemployment.

A firm׳s investment in corporate social responsibility (CSR) builds a positive image of caring for social good and imposes additional costs on executives׳ informed trading, which is widely perceived self-serving. We thus expect executives of CSR-conscious firms to be more likely to refrain from informed trading. We find that executives of CSR-conscious firms profit significantly less from insider trades and are less likely to trade prior to future news than executives of non-CSR-conscious firms. The negative association between CSR and insider trading profits is more pronounced when executives׳ personal interests are more aligned with the interests of the firm.

We find firm cyclicality decreases by 40% after the inception of credit default swap (CDS) trading. The effect stems from CDS firms’ less aggressive asset growth in good times and is stronger for firms facing a more severe empty creditor problem. Important identification issues are addressed. The result cannot be explained with debt overhang, bank lending cyclicality, or the cyclicality of firms’ business fundamentals. It holds for the cyclicality of various corporate outcomes (inventories, cash, and employment). Importantly, CDS trading impedes unhealthy growth and enhances profitability and firm value. Our finding indicates an important positive real effect of financial innovation.

We provide evidence regarding mutual funds’ motivation to hold lottery stocks. Funds with higher managerial ownership invest less in lottery stocks, suggesting that managers themselves do not prefer such stocks. The evidence instead supports that managers cater to fund investors’ preference for such stocks. In particular, funds with more lottery holdings attract larger flows after portfolio disclosure compared with their peers, and poorly performing funds tend to engage in risk shifting by increasing their lottery holdings toward year-ends. Funds’ aggregate holdings of lottery stocks contribute to their overpricing.