This study explores the effects of judicial independence on corporate innovation by analyzing the staggered establishment of Circuit Courts in China. We find that introducing Circuit Courts increases corporate innovation, particularly for central state-owned enterprises and private firms. Channel analysis shows that Circuit Courts significantly reduce local judicial protectionism, ease financial constraints, and improve corporate governance, which stimulates innovation. The positive effects of Circuit Courts are more pronounced in cities facing severe political intervention, regions with weak legal environments, and private firms without political or banking connections. Our results are robust to endogeneity concerns, alternative measures and specification models. Overall, this study supports the theoretical arguments that institutions matter and that improvements in judicial quality boost firms' incentives to innovate.

We provide the first comprehensive and robust evidence on the relationship between board independence and firm performance in China. We find that independent directors have an overall positive effect on firm operating performance in China. Our findings are robust to a battery of tests, including endogeneity checks using instrumental variables, the dynamic generalized method of moments estimator, and the difference-in-differences method. The positive relationship between board independence and firm performance is stronger in government-controlled firms and in firms with lower information acquisition costs. We also document that Chinese independent directors play an important role in constraining insider self-dealing and improving investment efficiency.

This study examines how government procurement impacts firms’ environmental disclosures and whether they have tangible effects. Using a triple-difference research design that exploits the exogenous increase in federal funding allocations to counties based on population census revisions, we find that firms with high exposure to government contracts significantly increase climate disclosure following expanded procurement opportunities. We also document that enhanced disclosure is characterized by a positive tone that emphasizes firms’ green investment and commitment to climate adaptation. The effect is more pronounced in counties with a greater increase in procurement volume and when firms have lower ex ante sustainability performance. Finally, we find firms that increase climate disclosure are more likely to earn government contracts, and they undertake real actions by reducing toxic emissions and enhancing the development of green products. Overall our results suggest government procurement promotes corporate climate responsibility by incentivizing firms to undertake climate mitigation actions.

We test whether CEOs working near their childhood homes are less likely than nonlocal CEOs to make myopic decisions. Place attachment theories suggest that people develop mutual caretaking relationships with their birthplaces. Also, executive labor markets face less information asymmetry about local CEOs, resulting in lower pressure on local CEOs for quick profits. Consistent with the prediction, we find that local CEOs are less likely to cut R&D expenditures for beating analyst forecasts or avoiding earnings decreases. In their last year of office, local CEOs are significantly less likely to cut R&D than nonlocal CEOs. The CEO locality effect is stronger when more local business interests are embedded in the firm and when the residents of the CEO's birth state have stronger local social bonds. Local CEOs' longer horizons are consistently manifested in their other decisions, such as paying more state tax and being more socially responsible in business operation.

We propose a model of sovereign debt in which countries vary in their level of financial development, defined as the extent to which they can issue debt denominated in domestic currency in international capital markets. We show that low levels of financial development generate the “debt intolerance” phenomenon that plagues emerging markets: it reduces overall debt capacity, increases credit spreads, and limits the country's ability to smooth consumption.

In this paper, we demonstrate that the funding value adjustments (FVAs) of major dealers are debt overhang costs to their shareholders. To maximize shareholder value, dealer quotations therefore adjust for FVAs. Our case studies include interest‐rate swap FVAs and violations of covered interest parity. Contrary to current valuation practice, FVAs are not themselves components of the market values of the positions being financed. Current dealer practice does, however, align incentives between trading desks and shareholders. We also establish a pecking order for preferred asset financing strategies and provide a new interpretation of the standard debit value adjustment.

We establish a significant and robust connection between asset growth (AG) and style investing by showing that past style returns constructed based on AG and size jointly predict future stock returns significantly. Motivated by this notion, we propose a style momentum strategy based on AG and size and find that it dominates price momentum and size-BM style momentum in generating momentum profits. We examine two explanations for this predictability, including risk exposure to common risk factors and the limited-attention theory. Empirical evidence shows that the AG-size style momentum profit is induced because investors neglect the AG-size style performance, consistent with the limited-attention explanation, but not risk exposure to the investment factor. Further, we show that the profit of the AG-size style momentum is robust to different time periods partitioned by several time-series predictors.

We implemented a randomized field experiment that tested ways to stimulate migrants’ savings in their origin country. We find that migrants value opportunities to exert greater control over financial activities in their home countries. We offered U.S.-based migrants bank accounts in El Salvador, randomly varying migrant control over El Salvador–based savings by offering different accounts across treatments. Migrants offered the greatest degree of control accumulated the most savings. Impacts likely represent increases in total savings; there is no evidence that savings increases were simply reallocated from other savings mechanisms. Enhanced control over home country savings does not affect remittances sent home.