We analyze two insider-trading regulations recently introduced by the Securities and Exchange Commission: mandatory disclosure and “cooling-off period”. The former requires insiders disclose trading plans at adoption, while the latter mandates a delay period before trading. These policies affect investors’ trading profits, risk sharing, and hence their welfare. If the insider has sufficiently large hedging needs, in contrast to the conventional wisdom from “sunshine trading”, disclosure reduces the welfare of all investors. In our calibration, a longer cooling-off period benefits speculators, and its implications for the insider and hedgers depend on whether the disclosure policy is already in place.

We study the impact of stochastic interest rates and capital illiquidity on investment and firm value by incorporating a widely used arbitrage-free term structure model of interest rates into a standard q theoretic framework. Our generalized q model informs us to use corporate credit-risk information to predict investments when empirical measurement issues of Tobin’s average q are significant (e.g., equity is much more likely to be mis-priced than debt), as in Philippon (2009). We find, consistent with our theory, that credit spreads and bond q have significant predictive powers on micro-level and aggregate investments corroborating the recent empirical work of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012). We also show that the quantitative effects of the stochastic interest rates and capital illiquidity on investment, Tobin’s average q, the duration and user cost of capital, and the value of growth opportunities are substantial. These findings are particularly important in today’s low interest rate environment.

We examine how directors with investment banking experience affect firms׳ acquisition behavior. We find that firms with investment bankers on the board have a higher probability of making acquisitions. Furthermore, acquirers with investment banker directors experience higher announcement returns, pay lower takeover premiums and advisory fees, and exhibit superior long-run performance. Overall, our results suggest that directors with investment banking experience help firms make better acquisitions, both by identifying suitable targets and by reducing the cost of the deals.

We show that scale in active equity portfolios is understated by at least 65% because the majority of mutual funds have “twin” institutional vehicles (IVs) managed under the same strategies. Omitting these IVs can severely skew crucial estimates in asset management research: by including IV assets, diminishing returns to scale of active investments is significantly reduced, and dollar value added of active strategies is more substantial and persistent than previously suggested. We further show that IV assets meaningfully influence managers’ portfolio decisions. In addition, these measurement issues apply to common flow measures and extend to passive funds and bond funds.

We develop an optimal tax-timing model that takes into account asymmetric long-term and short-term tax rates for positive capital gains and limited tax deductibility of capital losses. In contrast to the existing literature, this model can help explain why many investors not only defer short-term capital losses to long term but also defer large long-term capital gains and losses. Because the benefit of tax deductibility of capital losses increases with the short-term tax rates, effective tax rates can decrease as short-term capital gains tax rates increase.

Exploiting mergers between lenders and shareholders of the same firm as an exogenous shock to shareholder–creditor conflicts, we examine the causal effect of these conflicts on firms' ex ante expected stock price crash risk evident in the options implied volatility smirk. The decrease in conflicts of interest between lenders and shareholders induces dual holders to encourage the disclosure of more information to alleviate costly information asymmetry with other investors and better execute their oversight role in constraining managers' bad news suppression. Consistent with expectations, we find that a firm's ex ante expected crash risk declines after a shareholder–creditor merger. We also report strong, robust evidence that the negative impact of mergers on firms' expected crash risk increases when institutional investors or lenders have a greater stake in the treatment firms or when shareholder–creditor conflicts are apt to be exacerbated. Additionally, we document that firms issue management earnings forecasts (especially bad news forecasts) more frequently after these mergers. Finally, we find that expected crash risk decreases more after mergers in firms suffering worse information asymmetry and with weak monitoring mechanisms. Our evidence suggests that option market participants value the dual holder's role in deterring managers' bad news hoarding.

This study examines the association between customer base concentration and corporate public disclosure policy. When the customer base is more concentrated, large customers face lower costs of accessing the supplier firm's private information, reducing customers' overall demand for the supplier's public information, suggesting a negative association between customer concentration and the amount of public disclosure. Alternatively, large customers have greater bargaining power and may demand that the supplier firm provide more public disclosures. Consistent with customer concentration facilitating private information flow from the supplier to customers, we find that the frequencies of management earnings and sales forecasts are negatively associated with customer concentration among firms with major corporate customers. These associations are stronger when the supplier and customers are engaged in more relationship‐specific investments, when customers' private information acquisition costs are lower, and when it is less costly for customers to find another supplier.

We show that the likelihood of a liquidity crunch in wholesale U.S. dollar funding markets depends on levels of reserve balances at the financial institutions that are the most active intermediaries of these markets. Heightened risk of an imminent liquidity crunch is signaled by significant delays in intraday payments to these large financial institutions over the prior two weeks. Our study contributes to the broader dialogue surrounding the Federal Reserve’s ongoing quantitative tightening.