We develop a theory of innovation waves, investor sentiment, and merger activity based on Knightian uncertainty. Uncertainty-averse investors are more optimistic on an innovation when they can make contemporaneous investments in multiple uncertain projects. Innovation waves occur when there is a critical mass of innovative companies, and are characterized by stronger investor sentiment, higher equity valuation, and hot initial public offering markets. Our approach to investor sentiment is not based on erroneous beliefs disjoint from economic fundamentals, but depends on uncertainty on the fundamentals. Our model can explain sector-specific booms uncorrelated with aggregate economic activity and the overall stock market

[We explore the implications of financial system design for financial innovation. We begin with assumptions about the investment opportunities of firms, their observable attributes, and the roles of commercial banks, investment banks, and the financial market. We examine the borrower's choice between bank and financial market funding, the commercial bank's choice of monitoring capacity, and the investment bank's choice of whether to invest in financial innovation. Our main result is that financial innovation in a universal banking system is stochastically lower than innovation in a financial system in which commercial and investment banks are functionally separated

Motivating innovation is important in many incentive problems. This paper shows that the optimal innovation‐motivating incentive scheme exhibits substantial tolerance (or even reward) for early failure and reward for long‐term success. Moreover, commitment to a long‐term compensation plan, job security, and timely feedback on performance are essential to motivate innovation. In the context of managerial compensation, the optimal innovation‐motivating incentive scheme can be implemented via a combination of stock options with long vesting periods, option repricing, golden parachutes, and managerial entrenchment

Entrepreneurship is thought to be a key driver of economic growth. While there are myriad forms of entrepreneurship, ranging from self-employment to small and medium size enterprises to technology- and innovation-driven startups, recent research provides evidence that the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth is driven not by overall quantity of new firm entry, but rather by a small subset of high-growth startups that are primarily categorized as innovation-driven. This paper provides a survey of the growing literature on the economics of such innovation-driven entrepreneurship. We begin by distinguishing between the various forms of entrepreneurship, which are often confounded in both theory and empirical work. We lay out the current state of knowledge, and describe the challenges faced by researchers in the field, particularly around measurement, data and identification. We conclude with an overview of the major open questions and directions for future research in the area.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org

We use a unique dataset on domestic pension fund investments to estimate the relationship between pension fund investment and innovation within Danish unlisted firms. We find a significant positive association between pension fund investment and various measures of innovation, including those targeting green technologies. However, this association is attenuated in highly competitive industries, consistent with a governance channel through which pension funds exert discipline on managers. Overall, our study underscores the important role of pension funds in supporting firm innovation, particularly by reducing managerial slack and by supplying stable, long-term capital to unlisted firms

I. The industry, 406. — II. The process of innovation, 409. — III. A theory of innovation, 415

This paper investigates the effects of stock pledge by controlling shareholder on corporate's future innovation productivity and the mechanism through which stock pledge affects innovation. We find that both the existence of stock pledge by controlling shareholder and the percentage of shares pledged by controlling shareholder are significantly negatively related to firms' future innovation outputs and quality, and these baseline results are robust to a variety of tests on sample selections, model specifications, and variable definitions. We further adopt several methodologies to address endogeneity concerns and establish a causal relationship between stock pledge by controlling shareholder and innovation. We then provide evidence to show that the impediment effect of stock pledge by controlling shareholder on innovation is possibly due to controlling shareholder's fear of losing corporate control in case of innovation failure. Finally, we find that although stock pledge is a possible channel to relieve a firm's financial constraint, it does not encourage the firm to invest more in innovation

This paper examines the incentives offered by frictionless markets to innovate asset-backed securities by owners who maximize the assets' values. Assuming identical preferences across investors with heterogeneous risk-sharing needs, we characterize economies in which competition provides insufficient incentives to innovate so that, in equilibrium, financial markets are incomplete in all (pure strategy) equilibria, even when innovation is essentially costless. Thus, value maximization does not generally result in complete markets

Introduction: the “Schumpeterian” hypothesis, 167. — I. Oxygen steelmaking: the history of its invention and innovation, 169. — II. Some cost and profit implications of innovative lethargy, 184. — III. Conclusion, 188

In this paper I develop a model of a competitive financial system with unrestricted but costly entry and an endogenously determined number of competing financial institutions (“banks” for short). Banks can make standard loans on which plentiful historical data are available and unanimous agreement exists on default probabilities. Or banks can innovate and make new loans on which limited historical data are available, leading to possible disagreement over default probabilities. In equilibrium, banks make zero profits on standard loans and positive profits on innovative loans, which engenders innovation incentives for banks. But innovation brings with it the risk that investors could disagree with the bank that the loan is worthy of continued funding and hence could withdraw funding at an interim stage, precipitating a financial crisis. The degree of innovation in the financial system is determined by this trade-off. Welfare implications of financial innovation and mechanisms to reduce the probability of crises are discussed