We provide evidence that lenders with lower regulatory capital issue loans with lower financial covenant strictness, consistent with such lenders viewing borrower covenant violations as costlier. This is because a borrower covenant violation may lead the lender to downgrade the loan, which triggers accounting that further reduces regulatory capital. Because of regulatory scrutiny, this is true even if the lender waives the violation. We find that this association is concentrated in performance covenants rather than capital covenants. We also find that lenders with relatively low capital issue loans with lower amounts and shorter maturities, consistent with such lenders replacing covenant protection with stricter loan terms on other dimensions. Finally, we find that this form of lender capital management extends to loan syndicate participant lenders, in that participants with relatively low capital adequacy take smaller loan shares when the lead arranger sets high covenant strictness. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

This paper examines how changes in risk disclosures affect uncertainty about risk. We measure changes in risk disclosures using the addition and removal of individual risk factors to firms’ 10-K filings, identified via textual analysis of the risk factors section. Our market outcome is the variance risk premium (VRP), which captures the market’s pricing of uncertainty about firm risk. Following recent theoretical predictions, we predict and empirically document that newly disclosed signals of risk factor exposure—reflected in added and removed individual risk factors—decrease the uncertainty surrounding firm risk, as proxied via the VRP. We further confirm that individual risk factors offer incremental insights compared with alternative textual risk measures. Collectively, our findings suggest that textually evaluating individual risk factors reveals information about the uncertainty regarding firm risk. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Our paper examines three related questions: Will directors who have friendship ties with the CEO manage earnings to benefit the CEO in the short term while potentially sacrificing the welfare of the company in the long term? Will public disclosure of friendship ties mitigate or exacerbate such behavior, and will disclosure of friendship ties influence investors' perceptions of director decisions? We conduct an experiment involving 56 active and experienced corporate directors from U.S. firms and a second experiment with M.B.A. students. We find that friendship ties caused directors to be more willing to approve reductions to research and development (R&D) expenses that cause earnings to rise enough to meet the CEO's minimum bonus target more often than when the directors and CEO were not friends. However, disclosing friendship ties resulted in even greater reductions in R&D expenses and higher CEO bonuses than not disclosing friendship ties. In a second experiment, we find that shareholders were more likely to agree with directors' decisions to approve cuts to R&D when friendship ties were disclosed. These findings have potentially important implications for corporate governance because they suggest that friendship ties between the CEO and board members can impair the directors' independence and objectivity, and that disclosure of the relationships can worsen this effect.