Knowledge that Transforms

I. Origin of the split inventory. — Definition, 493.—The splitting date, 494. — Built-up value, 494. — Relation to pre-war valuation procedure, 495. — Objects of war-time valuation, 497. — Other war-time methods of valuation, 497. — Superiority of the split inventory, 498. — II. Development of the split inventory. — Early use of this method, 499. — Brooklyn Borough Gas case, 500. — The split inventory in the District of Columbia, 502. — The split inventory in Wisconsin, 506. — The Ashland decision, 508. — The end of the split inventory, 509. — III. The Interstate Commerce Commission and the split inventory. — The Commission's policy, 510. — The Transportation Act of 1920, 511. — The O'Fallon valuation, 512. — The source of the Commission's policy, 512. — IV. The split inventory in the Supreme Court. — The Galveston case, 513. — The Georgia case, 514. — The OTallon case, 515. — V. The split inventory in the future. — Its relation to prudent investment, 517. — Present conditions are favorable, 519. — The attitude of utilities, 520. — The attitude of the courts, 521.

I. Introduction, 462. — Failure of railroad regulation to accomplish the larger and ultimate object of regulation, 463. — The present problems of terminal regulation, 464. — The six categories of regulation, 465. —II. Analysis of Interstate Commerce Commission's Policy, 465.—The obligations of a rail carrier to perform switching services, 466. — The obligations of a carrier to build switch connections and to charge demurrage established, 471. — The obligations of a carrier to absorb terminal charges in certain traffic not effectively controlled in the absence of separation of terminal and Une haul charges, 474. — The obligations of a carrier to permit joint use of its terminal facilities not successfully established, 480. — The legality of terminal associations established, 483. — III. Conclusion: The Strength of the Interstate Commerce Commission's Policy, 484. — The conservative interpretation of the provisions for joint use of facilities, 486. — Unsatisfactory control of terminal charges, 486. — Need of a practical policy which conforms to recent conceptions of public interest, 490

I. Introduction, 523. — II. The fundamental role of budgetary deficits, 525.—III. The quantity theory, 528.—IV. Purchasing power parity, 533. — V. Conclusion, 536.

Public works the most flexible of the major public expenditures, 286.—Relief works, 287.—Mr. Hawtrey's objection to long-range planning of public works as a remedy, 289.—Professor Cassel's argument, 291.—Other arguments, 292.—Qualitative limitations to the plan, 293.—Quantitative limitations, 295.—Shifting of public construction may increase industrial fluctuations, 297.—Administrative obstacles to an ideal allocation of public contracts, 301.—The problem of coördination, 302.—Technical obstacles, 305.—Economic obstacles (1) due to unpredictability of business; 308 (2) due to uncertainty as to effect of remedial measures, 313.—Conclusion, 318.

Journal Article A Criticism on Bye's Theory of Public Utility Rate-Determination Get access Susumu Kobe Susumu Kobe University of Michigan Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 44, Issue 4, August 1930, Pages 706–710, https://doi.org/10.2307/1884032 Published: 01 August 1930

Further Thoughts on Depreciation and the Rate Base Get access George O. May George O. May Price, Waterhouse & Co., New York Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 44, Issue 4, August 1930, Pages 687–697, https://doi.org/10.2307/1884030 Published: 01 August 1930

Introduction, 2. — Previous discussions, 2. — Fertility rates, 7. — Lack of adequate data makes it impossible to reach precise conclusions of New England dying out, 9. — But such data as are available support the contention that the natives of New England are not maintaining their numbers, 14. — Conclusions, 18.

Introduction, 345.—Jones, 347.—Jenks and Clark, 348.—Watkins, 350.—Seager and Gulick, 355.—Levy, 360.—Fitzgerald, 361.—National Industrial Conference Board publications: Mergers in Industry, 363;—Mergers and the Law, 366.—Alsberg, 369.—Toulmin, 370.—Javits, 370.—Frederick, 371.—Conclusions: “the trust problem” a misnomer, 372; many questions still unanswered, 373.

Introduction: "fair return on fair valuation" of properties of natural monopolies an economically unsound policy, since it affords unsatisfactory control of investment, 263.—I. Adherence to this policy based upon misinterpretation of monopoly as essentially a phenomenon of distribution, 265.—II. Two approaches to monopoly control, 267.—III. Superiority of "regulated-investment" to "regulated-return" in control of under-invested simple monopoly, 273.—IV. Superiority of "regulated-investment" in control of over-invested simple monopoly, 277.—V. Discrimination as between different services supplied by a given monopoly reducible to same formula as that pertinent to simple monopoly, 282.

General character of the two studies, 320.—Crum's analysis of earning power: the "profit ratio, " 322; the "earnings ratio, " 326.—The return Upon capital invested, 330.—The proportion of profitable operations, 333.—Sloan's analysis of earnings, 334.—Frequency distribution of earnings in 1927 and 1917, 336.—The range of earnings, 339.—Relation between earnings and "especialty products, " 340.—More light needed, 342.