This paper estimates the difference in compensation between company-owned and franchisee-owned fast food restaurants. The contrast is of interest because contractual arrangements give managers of company-owned outlets less of an incentive to monitor and supervise employees. Estimates based on two data sets suggest that employee compensation is slightly greater at company-owned outlets than at franchisee-owned outlets. The earnings gap is 9 percent for assistant and shift managers and 2 percent for full-time crew workers. Furthermore, the tenure-earnings profile is steeper at company-owned restaurants. These findings suggest that monitoring difficulties influence the timing and generosity of compensation.

This paper uses job applications data to investigate the relationship between job queues and wage differentials. The main finding is that openings for jobs that pay the minimum wage attract more job applicants than jobs that pay either slightly more or slightly less than the minimum wage. This spike in the job application rate distribution suggests that ex ante rents generated for employees by an above market-level minimum wage are not completely dissipated by reductions in nonwage benefits. In addition, we find that highly unionized firms, large firms, and firms in high-wage industries tend to receive relatively many job applicants for openings.