This study examines the relation between accounting and capital market risk measures for a sample of 46 listed Asian banks during the period 1998–2003. By applying a panel data analysis that includes a control for country-specific factors, the results show that the standard deviation of the return-on-assets and loan-loss-reserves-to-gross-loans are significantly related to total risk. Also gross-loans-to-total-assets and loan-loss-reserves-to-gross-loans are significantly related to non-systematic risk. These results indicate that in these Asian countries, firm-specific risk is more important than systematic risk and the results are robust even though significant differences exist across Asian countries in banking activities, capital adequacy requirements, and deposit insurance protection.

Following the 1997/1998 financial crisis, Indonesian banks experienced major regulatory changes, including the adoption of the blanket guarantee scheme (BGS) in 1998, a limited guarantee (LG) in 2005, and changes in capital regulation in 1998 and 2001. We examine the impact of these regulatory changes on market discipline during the period 1995–2009. The price of deposits is used to measure market discipline in a dynamic panel data methodology on a sample of 104 commercial banks. We find a weakening of market discipline following the introduction of the BGS. The result is consistent with the deposit insurance scheme being credible in the lower capital requirement environment. The adoption of LG in a recovering economy also mitigates the role of market discipline. However, market discipline is more pronounced in listed banks than unlisted banks and in foreign banks than domestic banks. These results have important implications for banking regulation and supervision, particularly during a crisis period.