Using survey-based measures of mutual fund manager loss aversion, we study the effects of institutional investor preferences on their investment decisions, performance, and career outcomes. We find that managers with higher aversion to losses choose portfolios with lower downside risk, increase their risk-taking more in response to poor past performance, and display a stronger disposition effect. Further, we provide evidence that managers who are more loss-averse have lower performance and are more likely to have their contracts terminated.

Abstract I analyze the portfolios of individual investors who have changed their place of residence. As distance from a company they invest in changes, investors adjust their portfolio composition. The farther investors move away from the closest establishment of a company in their portfolio, the more of its shares they sell compared to investors who do not move. Among the companies that investors held before the move, after moving, investors abnormally increase their ownership in companies closer to their new location; these companies provide them with higher risk-adjusted returns than companies in which they kept holdings unchanged or abnormally reduced holdings.

[We study holdings in merger and acquisition (M& A) targets by financial conglomerates in which affiliated investment banks advise the bidders. We show that advisors take positions in the targets before M& A announcements. These stakes are positively related to the probability of observing the bid and to the target premium. We argue that this can be explained in terms of advisors who are privy to important information about the deal, investing in the target in the expectation of its price increasing. We document the high profits of this strategy. The advisory stake is positively related to the likelihood of deal completion and to the termination fees. However, these deals are not wealth creating: there is a negative relation between the advisory stake and the viability of the deal.]

[We study the effects of the controlling shareholders' portfolio diversification on the initial public offering (IPO) process. Less diversified shareholders have more to gain from taking their firm public, and are more willing to accept a lower price for shares. We test these hypotheses using the data on all IPOs in Sweden between 1995 and 2001. Using detailed information on the portfolio composition of shareholders in private and public firms, we construct several proxies of their portfolio diversification and relate them to the probability of the IPO and the underpricing. We show that the less diversified individual shareholders, especially those with lower wealth, sell more of their shares at the IPO. Firms held by less diversified controlling shareholders are more likely to go public, and exhibit higher underpricing. These effects are economically and statistically significant, while the diversification of noncontrolling shareholders has no effect. Our findings suggest that diversification of controlling shareholders plays a prominent role in the IPO process.]

We study whether mutual funds systematically manage the downside risk of their portfolios in ways that improve their performance. We find that actively managed mutual funds on average possess positive downside-risk-timing ability. Managers adjust funds’ downside risk exposure in response to macroeconomic information; however, downside-risk-timing skills remain strong even after controlling for macro variables. Funds more skilled in timing downside risk outperform those that are not by 14.3 bp per month (or 1.73% annualized) unconditionally and by 39.9 bp per month (or 4.89% annualized) during recessions; they also attract larger flows. Received September 11, 2016; editorial decision Januaruy 08, 2018 by Editor Wayne Ferson.

Abstract Measuring the extent to which a firm is financially constrained is critical in assessing capital structure. Extant measures of financial constraints focus on macro firm characteristics such as age and size, variables highly correlated with other firm attributes. We parse 10-K disclosures filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) using a unique lexicon based on constraining words. We find that the frequency of constraining words exhibits very low correlation with traditional measures of financial constraints and predicts subsequent liquidity events, such as dividend omissions or increases, equity recycling, and underfunded pensions, better than widely used financial constraint indexes.

We provide direct evidence on the effect of financial expertise on investment outcomes by analyzing private portfolios of mutual fund managers. We find no evidence that financial experts make better investment decisions than peers: they do not outperform, do not diversify their risks better, and do not exhibit lower behavioral biases. Managers do much better in stocks for which they have an information advantage over other investors, i.e., stocks that are also held by their mutual funds. More experienced managers seem to be aware of the limitations to their investment skills as they increase their holdings of mutual fund-related stocks following poor performance of their portfolios. Our results suggest that there are limits to the value added by financial expertise.

Abstract We examine the relation between the shareholder base and payout policy. Consistent with the idea that the shareholder base is related to the cost of external financing, we find that firms with small shareholder bases have lower payout levels and maintain higher cash holdings. We show that undertaking an open market repurchase results in a significant reduction in the size of the shareholder base. Consequently, we find that firms with small shareholder bases are less likely to undertake a repurchase (reduce the shareholder base even further) and are more likely to pay special dividends.

In Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) a significant proportion of targets’ equity is owned by financial institutions that simultaneously own targets’ bonds (“dual holders”). Targets with larger equity ownership by dual holders have lower M&A equity premia and larger abnormal bond returns, particularly when dual holders stand to benefit more from appreciation of their bond stakes, e.g., when their bond ownership in the target is large and the target credit rating is non-investment grade. Dual holders are more likely to vote in favor of the merger proposal. Our results suggest the presence of coordination of decisions within dual holding financial conglomerates in M&A targets.

Using survey-based measures of mutual fund manager loss aversion, we study the effects of institutional investor preferences on their investment decisions, performance, and career outcomes. We find that managers with higher aversion to losses choose portfolios with lower downside risk, increase their risk-taking more in response to poor past performance, and display a stronger disposition effect. Further, we provide evidence that managers who are more loss-averse have lower performance and are more likely to have their contracts terminated. Received December 3, 2014; editorial decision May 25, 2016 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.