[When a developed-country multinational firm acquires majority control of a firm in an emerging market, there is an economically large and statistically significant increase in the acquiring firm's stock price. In 1986-2006, developed-market acquirers experienced positive and significant abnormal returns of 1.16%, on average, over a three-day event window. Positive acquirer returns and dollar value gains appear unique to emerging-market mergers and acquisitions and are not replicated when the same developed-market acquirers take over firms in developed markets. The size of the stock price increase is more pronounced (a) the weaker the contracting environment in the emerging market and (b) for industries with high asset intangibility.]

In the three-year period following stock market liberalizations, the growth rate of the typical firm's capital stock exceeds its pre-liberalization mean by an average of 4.1 percentage points. Cross-sectional changes in investment are significantly correlated with the signals about fundamentals embedded in the stock price changes that occur upon liberalization. Panel-data estimations show that a 10-percentage point increase in a firm's expected future sales growth predicts a 2.9- to 3.5-percentage point increase in the growth rate of its capital stock. Country-specific changes in the cost of capital drive changes in investment but firm-specific changes in the cost of capital do not.

From 1980 to 1992, emerging and developing countries grew by 3.4 percent per year. Their annual rate of growth increased to 5.4 percent between 1993 and 2012. No such increase occurred for advanced nations, whose average growth from 1980 to 2012 was roughly constant (excluding the impact of the 2008-2009 Recession). Developing nations turned themselves around by embracing discipline-sustained commitment to a pragmatic and flexible growth strategy. Three illustrations of discipline through the lens of trade, fiscal, and debt reforms in the developing world offer relevant, practical lessons for recovery in advanced economies and continued catch-up growth in developing nations.

When countries liberalize their stock markets, firms that become eligible for foreign purchase (investible), experience an average stock price revaluation of 15.1%. Since the historical covariance of the average investible firm's stock return with the local market is roughly 200 times larger than its historical covariance with the world market, liberalization reduces the systematic risk associated with holding investible securities. Consistent with this fact: (1) the average effect of the reduction in systematic risk is 6.8 percentage points, or roughly two fifths of the total revaluation; and (2) the firm‐specific revaluations are directly proportional to the firm‐specific changes in systematic risk.

This paper investigates the influence of incumbent firms on the decision to allow foreign direct investment into an industry. Using data from India's economic reforms, the results show that firms in concentrated industries are more successful at preventing foreign entry, state-owned firms are more successful at stopping foreign entry than privately-owned firms, and profitable state-owned firms are more successful at stopping foreign entry than unprofitable state-owned firms. The pattern of foreign entry liberalization supports the private interest view of policy implementation and suggests that it may be necessary to reduce the influence of state-owned firms to optimally enact reforms.

When a developed-country multinational firm acquires majority control of a firm in an emerging market, there is an economically large and statistically significant increase in the acquiring firm's stock price. In 1986–2006, developed-market acquirers experienced positive and significant abnormal returns of 1.16%, on average, over a three-day event window. Positive acquirer returns and dollar value gains appear unique to emerging-market mergers and acquisitions and are not replicated when the same developed-market acquirers take over firms in developed markets. The size of the stock price increase is more pronounced (a) the weaker the contracting environment in the emerging market and (b) for industries with high asset intangibility.

This study explores the relationship between sovereign credit risk, banking fragility, and global financial factors in a large panel database of emerging market economies. To measure banking fragility, we construct a novel model-based semi-parametric metric (JLoss) that computes the expected joint loss of the banking sector in each country conditional on a country-level systemic event. Our metric of banking fragility is positively associated with sovereign credit spreads, after controlling for the standard determinants of sovereign credit risk, a comprehensive set of measures of systemic risk, and country and time fixed effects. The results additionally indicate that countries with more fragile banking sectors are more exposed to global (exogenous) financial factors than those with more resilient banking sectors. These findings underscore that regulators must ensure the stability of the banking sector to improve governments’ borrowing costs in international debt markets.

This paper examines the spillover effects of U.S. unconventional monetary policy (UMP) on emerging market capital flows and asset prices. Affine term structure model estimates show that U.S. monetary policy shocks, identified with high-frequency Treasury futures data, represent revisions to expected short-term yields and term premia, especially during the UMP period. The policy shocks exhibit sizable effects on U.S. holdings of emerging market assets. These effects disproportionately manifest through valuation changes versus physical flows, are more pronounced for equity relative to bond markets, and are asymmetric between the quantitative easing and tapering periods, with flows more important during the unwinding.