We show that financial constraints lead to spatial misallocation and contribute to racial disparities in housing and wealth accumulation. Using bunching and difference-in-differences designs, we document that down payment constraints disproportionately limit the ability of Black households to access housing in high-opportunity areas. We build a dynamic life-cycle model to examine the long-term wealth effects of these leverage distortions on group differences in wealth accumulation. Black households are more affected by financial and spatial frictions, limiting wealth building opportunities. Improving mortgage access and housing supply in high-opportunity areas helps reduce racial wealth disparities, emphasizing the need for access to geographic opportunities rather than homeownership alone.

ABSTRACT In this paper, I identify shocks to interest rates resulting from two administrative details in adjustable‐rate mortgage contract terms: the choice of financial index and the choice of lookback period. I find that a 1 percentage point increase in interest rate at the time of adjustable‐rate mortgage (ARM) reset results in a 2.5 percentage increase in the probability of foreclosure in the following year, and that each foreclosure filing leads to an additional 0.3 to 0.6 completed foreclosures within a 0.10‐mile radius. In explaining this result, I emphasize price effects, bank‐supply responses, and borrower responses arising from peer effects.

Abstract We ask whether the correlation between mortgage leverage and default is due to moral hazard (the causal effect of leverage) or adverse selection (ex ante risky borrowers choosing larger loans). We separate these information asymmetries using a natural experiment resulting from the contract structure of option adjustable-rate mortgages and unexpected 2008 divergence of indexes that determine rate adjustments. Our point estimates suggest that moral hazard is responsible for 40% of the correlation in our sample, while adverse selection explains 60%. We calibrate a simple model to show that leverage regulation must weigh default prevention against distortions due to adverse selection.

We show remote work led to large drops in lease revenues, occupancy, and market rents in the commercial office sector. We revalue New York City office buildings, taking into account both the cash flow and discount rate implications of these shocks, and find a 46 percent decline in long-run value. For all US office markets combined, we find a $556.8 billion value destruction. Higher-quality buildings were buffered against these trends due to a flight to quality, while lower-quality offices are at risk of becoming a stranded asset. These valuation changes have repercussions for financial stability and local public finances. (JEL E31, E32, G12, J22, M51, R33)

ABSTRACT We propose a new valuation method for private equity (PE) investments. It constructs a replicating portfolio using cash flows on listed equity and fixed‐income instruments (strips). It then values the strips using an asset pricing model that captures the risk in the cross‐section of bonds and equity factors. The method delivers a risk‐adjusted profit on each PE investment and a time series for the expected return on each fund category. We find negative risk‐adjusted profits for the average PE fund, with substantial heterogeneity and some persistence in the performance. Expected returns and risk‐adjusted profit decline in the later part of the sample.

We show that the COVID-19 pandemic brought house price and rent declines in city centers, and price and rent increases away from the center, thereby flattening the bid-rent curve in most U.S. metropolitan areas. Across MSAs, the flattening of the bid-rent curve is larger when working from home is more prevalent, housing markets are more regulated, and supply is less elastic. Housing markets predict an urban revival with urban rent growth exceeding suburban rent growth for the foreseeable future, as working from home recedes.

We investigate whether homeowners respond strategically to news of mortgage modification programs. We exploit plausibly exogenous variation in modification policy induced by settlement of US state government lawsuits against Countrywide Financial Corporation, which agreed to offer modifications to seriously delinquent borrowers. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we find that Countrywide's monthly delinquency rate increased more than 0.54 percentage points—a 10 percent relative increase—immediately after the settlement's announcement. The estimated increase in default rates is largest among borrowers least likely to default otherwise. These results suggest that strategic behavior should be an important consideration in designing mortgage modification programs. (JEL D14, G21, K22, R31)