The COVID-19 shock and its unprecedented financial consequences have brought about vast uncertainty concerning the future of climate actions. We study the cross-section of stock returns during the COVID-19 shock to explore investors' views and expectations about environmental issues. The results show that firms with responsible strategies on environmental issues experience better stock returns. This effect is mainly driven by initiatives addressing climate change (e.g., reduction of environmental emissions and energy use), is more pronounced for firms with greater ownership by investors with long-term orientation and is not observed prior to the COVID-19 crisis. Overall, the results indicate that the COVID-19 shock has not distracted investors' attention away from environmental issues but on the contrary led them to reward climate responsibility to a larger extent.

Bank capital is the cornerstone of bank regulation and is considered a key determinant of a bank's ability to withstand economic shocks. In the area of bank capital regulation, the general view is that more bank capital is better, irrespective of who provides it. In this paper, we investigate whether the investment horizon of bank capital providers matters for bank performance during the recent financial crisis. We observe that banks with more short-term investor ownership have worse stock returns during the crisis. Further exploration suggests that this is partially because banks with higher short-term investor ownership took more risk prior to the crisis but mainly because they experienced higher selling pressure during the crisis. Our results confirm the economic benefit of bank capital in helping banks to perform better during crises. However, when we decompose bank capital by the nature of its providers, we show that more capital is associated with worse performance when it is provided by short-term institutional investors.

We examine the relationship between institutional ownership and bank capital. Using a large sample of U.S. banks, we show that banks with greater institutional ownership operate with substantially higher capital ratios. The results are robust to controlling for standard determinants of bank capital structure, including market- and accounting-based risk measures. The results hold both for indexers and non-indexers, indicating that the effect of institutional ownership on bank capital cannot be explained by self-selection. We further address endogeneity concerns using an instrumental variable strategy based on the inclusion of banks in the S&P index. We find supporting evidence that the superior monitoring abilities of institutional investors, which reduce the severity of agency costs, is the main explanation for our results.

This paper examines whether stock market listing influences the persistence of bank performance across crises. We find that for both publicly and privately held banks, bank performance during the 1998 crisis is a strong predictor of bank performance during the 2007–2008 crisis. While for publicly held banks, the persistence is uniquely driven by bottom performers, for privately held banks the persistence is also driven by a group of top performers. We further show that banks that make a private-to-public transition between the two crises underperform in the 2007–08 crisis, especially if they are top performers during the 1998 crisis and more concerned about short-term stock price. We also document that after making a private-to-public transition, banks increase risk in a way that makes them more vulnerable to crises.

In this study, we explore the implications of institutional investor distraction for earnings management. Our identification approach relies on a firm-level measure of institutional investor distraction that exploits exogenous attention-grabbing shocks to unrelated parts of institutional investors' portfolios. We find that firms with distracted institutional shareholders engage more in both accrual-based and real earnings management. Further analyses show that the association between investor distraction and earnings management is stronger in firms with low analyst coverage and weak board monitoring, as well as in firms where managing earnings upward allows meeting or just beating their earnings target. Collectively, our results suggest that managers exploit the loosening in monitoring intensity resulting from investor distraction by engaging in earnings management. Even in the presence of institutional investors with superior monitoring abilities, limited attention may induce insufficient monitoring of earnings management practices.