In the absence of perfect annuity markets, individual consumers generally undertake precautionary saving to provide resources for their future consumption in the event that they live longer than expected. Kotlikoff, Shoven, and Spivak (in this issue) (hereafter KSS) have provided us with a well-conceived and well-executed study of the effects of various annuity arrangements on individual and aggregate saving in the presence of lifetime uncertainty. Each of these authors has had a long-standing interest in this area, and their current paper reflects their accumulated expertise. Their results indicate that a potentially sizable fraction of U.S. household wealth represents precautionary saving resulting from the absence of perfect annuity market.

According to section 4510 of the CICA Handbook “supplementary information about the effects of changing prices should be disclosed …” by certain corporations. Three hundred and eighty firms met the Handbook criteria in 1983, but only 73 complied, even partially. This study describes the disclosers and nondisclosers, with the objective of understanding why the CICA recommendation received such a cool reception. The findings support the hypothesis that Canadian firms disclosed nonhistone cost accounting data on the basis of cost/benefit considerations, and that auditors played a role in influencing the disclosures. There was virtually no disclosure of current cost information by clients of other than the Big Eight auditing firms. Utilities, subject to different political pressures than other firms, were apparently relatively more strongly influenced by the materiality of the disclosures. Among the nondisclosers, firms that were a little larger than average, were SEC registrants, and apparently would have shown the most material current cost adjustments if they had disclosed, tended to give reasons for not disclosing. Their publicly stated reasons implied that the costs of disclosing exceeded the benefits to them, or that they believed that the information was not useful to financial statement readers. In contrast to the United States, where compliance with similar disclosures described in FASB 33 is legally enforced by the SEC, Canada provides a laboratory for examining the relatively free choice of whether to disclose or not. Whether revamping section 4510 would increase its acceptability is left as an issue for further research to resolve. Résumé. Selon le chapitre 4510 du Manuel de l'I.C.C.A., certaines sociétés “doivent présenter un supplément d'informations sur les effets des variations de prix”. Alors que trois cent quatre‐vingts firmes satisfaisaient aux exigences du Manuel en 1983, seulement soixante treize d'entre elles se sontpliées aux exigences de divulgation, et ce partiellement. Cette étude décrit les sociétés “divulgatrices” et “non‐divulgatrices”, et vise à comprendre le faible enthousiasme pour les recommandations de l'I.C.C.A. Les résultats appuient l'hypothèse que les sociétés canadiennes ayant présenté des informations sur la base de la comptabilité aux coûts actuels l'ont fait par suite d'analyses coûts/avantages, de même que l'influence des vérificateurs sur ce type de divulgation. Il n'y a presque pas eu de présentation d'informations aux coûts actuels de la part des sociétés vérifiées par des cabinets autres que les constituantes des “Big Eight”. Les entreprises de services publics, sur lesquelles s'exercent des pressions politiques d'une nature différente de celles des autres sociétés, ont été relativement plus influencées par l'importance relative de cette divulgation. Parmi les sociétés “non‐divulgatrices”, celles de taille quelque peu supérieure à la moyenne, inscrites à la SEC, et qui apparemment auraient montré les ajustements de coûts actuels les plus importants en vertu du mode de présentation suggéré, avaient tendance à justifier la non‐divulgation de tels renseignements. L'analyse avantages/coûts défavorable, ou l'utilité discutable de telles informations pour les lecteurs d‘états financiers, constituaient les raisons invoquées par ces sociétés à l'appui de la non‐divulgation. Contrairement aux Etats‐Unis, où l'adhésion aux recommandations du FASB 33 portant sur une information de nature similaire est exigée par la SEC, le Canada fournit un laboratoire où il est possible d'examiner un libre‐choix relatif de divulgation ou de non‐divulgation. En vertu des résultats de cette étude, l'utilité des informations présentées selon le chapitre 4510 peut être mise en doute. La modification en profondeur du chapitre 4510 comme élément de solution à la non‐adhésion s'avère une question sur laquelle les recherches ultérieures devront se pencher.

This paper uses industry price-cost margin data to estimate the extent to which unions reduce profits. Estimates allowing for the endogeneity of union status are contrasted with estimates that assume union status is exogenous and not determined in part by either profitability or industry structure. Endogeneity is found to be an important consideration in estimating the union impact on profits: two-stage estimates are considerably larger than OLS estimates. The final section explores the total estimated redistribution from capital to labor in the manufacturing sector. An important conclusion is that unions raise prices less than was previously believed.

The steady-state effect on inequality of linear redistributive schemes based on the taxation of earnings, inheritances, or some combination of the two is examined. Dynasties that exhibit asexual reproduction and altruism are modeled. Earnings ability, which may be correlated across generations, is exogenous and drawn from a stationary distribution. Taxing inheritances increases inequality by reducing the intergenerational averaging of "luck." In an example, paying out the tax revenue in uniform transfers typically does not reverse this result. Taxing lifetime wealth or income adds a lump-sum tax on earnings, making redistribution more successful. However, this success is sensitive to the relative size of mean earnings and inheritances.

This paper examines the amount of precautionary savings and wealth inequality arising from life-span uncertainty by comparing saving behavior under perfect insurance arrangements with that arising under imperfect arrangements, namely, when longevity risk can be pooled only with members of one's own family. The central findings of the paper are: (1) perfecting insurance arrangements can lower savings in intergenerationally altruistic and life-cycle economies and (2) in altruistic economies perfecting annuity insurance can influence in-equality; indeed, in the long run in the model, switching from imperfect family insurance to perfect insurance can mean the difference between absolute inequality and absolute equality. Copyright 1986 by University of Chicago Press.

The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that the nonunion wage differential consists of two effects. The first represents the differential between the wage of a nonunion worker in a collective bargaining unit and the wage paid to a comparable worker not covered by a bargaining agreement. This effect arises from the monopoly power of organized labor. The second is the wage differential between union and nonunion workers in collective bargaining units. This latter effect is attributed to economic benefits that unionism brings to its members. Empirical evidence is presented in support of both effects.

This paper examines the implications of adverse selection in the private annuity market for the pricing of private annuities and the consequent effects on constrption and bequest behavior. With privately known heterogeneous mortality probabilities, adverse selection causes the rate of return on private annuities to be less than the actuarially fair rate based on population average mortality. However, a fully funded social security system with compulsory participation can offer an implied rate of return equal to the actuarially fair rate based on population average mortality. Thus, since social security offers a higher rate of return than private annuities, consumers cannot completely offset the effects of social security by transacting in the private annuity market. Using an overlapping generations model with uncertain lifetimes, we demonstrate that the introduction of actuarially fair social security reduces the steady state rate of return on annuities and raises the steady state levels of average bequests and average consumption of the young. The steady state national capital stock rises or falls according to the strength of the bequest motive.

The term structure relations implied by a model in which preferences are non-separable functions of the service flows from two goods are investigated. The parameters characterizing preferences are estimated and restrictions on the co-movements of consumptions and Treasury bill returns are examined. Both the durability of goods and the non-separability of preferences are important factors in explaining the time paths of individual returns, but there is substantial evidence against the cross-sectional restrictions implied by our model. Differences between sample mean returns are too large relative to the sample covariances of the return differences and the marginal utility of consumption.

Several predetermined variables that reflect levels of bond and stock prices appear to predict returns on common stocks of firms of various sizes, long-term bonds of various default risks, and default-free bonds of various maturities. The returns on small-firm stocks and low-grade bonds are more highly correlated in January than in the rest of the year with previous levels of asset prices, especially prices of small-firm stocks. Seasonality is found in several conditional risk measures, but such seasonality is unlikely to explain, and in some cases is opposite to, the seasonal found in mean returns.