When firms are forced to publicly disclose financial information, credit rating agencies are generally expected to improve their risk assessments. Theory predicts such an information quality effect but also suggests an adverse reputational concerns effect since credit analysts may become increasingly concerned about alleged rating failures. We empirically examine these predictions using a large-scale quasi-natural experiment in Germany, where a new compliance regime required firms to disclose annual financial statements publicly. Consistent with the reputational concerns hypothesis, we find an average increase in credit rating downgrades that is entirely driven by changes in the discretionary assessments of credit analysts rather than changes in firm fundamentals. Following public disclosure regulations, analysts tend to give positive private information less weight in their risk assessments while assigning greater weight to negative public information. A final set of results indicates that professional credit providers recognize that the resulting downgrades are not warranted.

Much research has suggested that independent boards of directors are more effective in reducing agency costs and improving firm governance. How they influence innovation is less clear. Relying on regulatory changes, we show that firms that transition to independent boards focus on more crowded and familiar areas of technology. They patent and claim more and receive more total future citations to their patents. However, the citation increase comes mainly from incremental patents in the middle of the citation distribution; the numbers of uncited and highly cited patents—arguably associated with riskier innovation strategies—do not change significantly.

Abstract We provide evidence that an influx of technical human capital improves regional entrepreneurship, both by increasing firm entry and reducing entrepreneurial failure. The results also indicate negative externalities upon lowtech and competing industries: an influx of inventors in a county shifts the locus of venture capital investment away from low-tech startups to high-tech startups and moreover towards new ventures in the same sector as those inventors' skills. We strengthen causal inference with a shift-share instrument which combines the spatial distribution of surnames in the LM>= U.S. Census with thousands of surnamespecific shifts based on modern inventor mobility.

Abstract Schumpeter (1939) claims that recessions are periods of “creative destruction,” concentrating innovation that is useful for the long-term growth of the economy. However previous research finds that standard measures of firms’ innovation, such as R&D expenditures or raw patent counts, concentrate in booms. We argue that these measures do not capture shifts in firms’ innovative search strategies. We contemplate firms’ choice between exploration versus exploitation over the business cycle and find evidence with more nuanced measures of patent characteristics that firms shift toward exploration during contractions and exploitation during expansions, with a stronger effect for firms in more cyclical industries.

Abstract Research and development tax credits often aim to increase investment in experimentation, hoping that firms invent fundamentally new technologies that in turn generate positive spillovers. Since most policies require that companies make profits in order to claim credits, they might also shift investments towards less risky refinement and exploitation. Following the availability of credits, we demonstrate that firms do not experiment but deepen invention in areas of extant expertise. We observe stronger shifts for firms operating in uncertain markets where search failures are more likely to reduce credit eligibility.