Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) showed the importance of multilateral resistance general equilibrium effects in estimating the response of trade flows to trade costs. We integrate this into Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein's (2008) extension of Anderson and van Wincoop's framework, which allows for firm heterogeneity, in order to quantify the different margins of adjustment. For bilateral trade cost changes, the general equilibrium effects are small. Surprisingly, most country pairs reduce their trade after a multilateral fall in trade costs. The global trade response to lower costs is positive, amplified by firm entry, but significantly dampened by multilateral resistance.

This paper examines the role of macroprudential capital requirements in preventing inefficient credit booms in a model with reputational externalities. In our model, unprofitable banks have strong incentives to invest in risky assets when macroeconomic fundamentals are good in order to avoid the stigma of being assessed as low ability by the market. We show that across-the-system countercyclical capital requirements that deter such gambling are constrained optimal when fundamentals are neither extremely weak nor extremely strong.

Abstract This paper studies the optimal design of a macro-prudential instrument, a loan-to-value (LTV) limit, and its implications for monetary policy in a model with nominal rigidities and financial frictions. The analysis accounts for both an effective lower bound on the nominal interest rate and an upper bound on the ability of LTV limits to stimulate credit demand. The welfare-based loss function features a role for macro-prudential policy to enhance risk-sharing. Optimal LTV limits are strongly countercyclical. In a house price boom-bust episode, the active use of LTV limits alleviates debt-deleveraging dynamics and prevents the economy from falling into a liquidity trap.