[This article analyzes optimal nonlinear portfolio management contracts. We consider a setting in which the investor faces moral hazard with respect to the effort and risk choices of the portfolio manager. The employment contract promises the manager: (i) a fixed payment, (ii) a proportional asset-based fee, (iii) a benchmark-linked fulcrum fee, and (iv) a benchmark-linked option-type "bonus" incentive fee. We show that the optiontype incentive helps overcome the effort-underinvestment problem that undermines linear contracts. More generally, we find that for the set of contracts we consider, with the appropriate choice of benchmark it is always optimal to include a bonus incentive fee in the contract. We derive the conditions that such a benchmark must satisfy. Our results suggest that current regulatory restrictions on asymmetric performance-based fees in mutual fund advisory contracts may be costly.]

The acceleration of the U.S. productivity growth in the late 1990s suggests a significant advance in technological innovation, making the perceived probability of entering a “new economy” ever increasing. Based on macroeconomic data, we identify a Bayesian investor's belief evolution when facing a possible structural break in the economy. We show that such belief evolution plays a significant role in explaining both the stock market boom and crash during 1998 to 2001. We conclude that a rational investor's uncertainty about the future of the U.S. economy provides an alternative explanation for the late 1990s stock market “bubble.”

ABSTRACT The acceleration of the U.S. productivity growth in the late 1990s suggests a significant advance in technological innovation, making the perceived probability of entering a “new economy” ever increasing. Based on macroeconomic data, we identify a Bayesian investor's belief evolution when facing a possible structural break in the economy. We show that such belief evolution plays a significant role in explaining both the stock market boom and crash during 1998 to 2001. We conclude that a rational investor's uncertainty about the future of the U.S. economy provides an alternative explanation for the late 1990s stock market “bubble.”

We model the employee incentive problem jointly with a firm’s exit decision. Our model predicts that firms in industries where human capital is important are more likely to go public and use high-powered, stock-based compensation. We also show that the higher the management quality, the more likely a firm is to go public than to be acquired. Regarding life cycle, a firm with high capital intensity and/or high management quality will choose to go public at a younger age.

We study the impact of the tournament-like competition in the mutual fund industry by examining the Active Share choices of funds. Funds with relatively poor performance by the end of the third quarter in a calendar year tend to increase their Active Share during the last quarter. The increase in the trailing funds’ Active Share is accompanied by an increase in the funds’ downside risk exposure. The evidence suggests that the strategic shifts in Active Share we document are not information/skill motivated.

This article analyzes optimal nonlinear portfolio management contracts. We consider a setting in which the investor faces moral hazard with respect to the effort and risk choices of the portfolio manager. The employment contract promises the manager: (i) a fixed payment, (ii) a proportional asset-based fee, (iii) a benchmark-linked fulcrum fee, and (iv) a benchmark-linked option-type “bonus” incentive fee. We show that the option-type incentive helps overcome the effort-underinvestment problem that undermines linear contracts. More generally, we find that for the set of contracts we consider, with the appropriate choice of benchmark it is always optimal to include a bonus incentive fee in the contract. We derive the conditions that such a benchmark must satisfy. Our results suggest that current regulatory restrictions on asymmetric performance-based fees in mutual fund advisory contracts may be costly.

Abstract This paper provides the first systematic evidence on a recent industry innovation: money market funds offering multiple intraday NAV strikes and redemption windows. Emerging after the 2016 floating-NAV reforms, these multistrike funds hold safer, more liquid assets than traditional single-strike funds offering end-of-day redemptions, yet face substantially larger outflows during periods of market stress. Our findings point to a structural concentration of liquidity-sensitive investors in multistrike funds, revealing how fund microstructure influences run dynamics among sophisticated institutions. Despite evolving liquidity requirements, the core behavioral and structural differences we identify remain highly relevant for evaluating ongoing and future regulatory reforms

We document that a firm’s culture, specifically, its religiosity, affects its cost of debt. Firms in higher-religiosity counties have higher credit ratings and lower debt costs. The impact of religiosity is stronger for firms with greater information asymmetry and during recessions. Further, religiosity has additional explanatory power for the cost of bank loans (but not the cost of public bonds) beyond its impact through ratings. This supports the argument that banks have superior abilities in pricing soft information, such as corporate culture. Finally, the impact of religiosity is stronger when the lender is a small bank.

Implicit guarantees provided by financial intermediaries are a key component of China's shadow banking sector. We show theoretically that project screening by intermediaries, accompanied by their implicit guarantees to investors, can be the second-best arrangement and mitigate capital misallocation that favors state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Using a dataset of trusts’ investment products, we find, consistent with our model, that ex ante expected yields reflect borrower risks and implicit guarantee strength, and risk sensitivity is reduced by strong guarantees. Regulations in 2018 restricting implicit guarantees lead to a weaker relationship between yield spread and guarantee strength, and more credit rationing of non-SOEs.