This study investigates the valuation effect of modified audit opinions (MAOs) on the emerging Chinese stock market. Here, the term MAO refers to both qualified opinions and unqualified opinions with explanatory notes. The latter can be considered an alternative form of a qualified opinion in China. The institutional setting in China enables us to find compelling evidence in support of the monitoring role of independent auditing as an institution. First, we find a significantly negative association between MAOs and cumulative abnormal returns after controlling for effects of other concurrent announcements. Further, results from a by-year analysis suggest that investors did not reach negative consensus about MAOs' valuation effect until the second year, exhibiting the learning process of a market without prior exposure to MAOs. Second, we do not observe significant differences between market reaction to non-GAAP- and GAAP-violation-related MAOs. Third, no significant difference is found between market reaction to qualified opinions and market reaction to unqualified opinions with explanatory notes.

This study investigates the valuation effect of modified audit opinions (MAOs) on the emerging Chinese stock market. Here, the term MAO refers to both qualified opinions and unqualified opinions with explanatory notes. The latter can be considered an alternative form of a qualified opinion in China. The institutional setting in China enables us to find compelling evidence in support of the monitoring role of independent auditing as an institution. First, we find a significantly negative association between MAOs and cumulative abnormal returns after controlling for effects of other concurrent announcements. Further, results from a by‐year analysis suggest that investors did not reach negative consensus about MAOs' valuation effect until the second year, exhibiting the learning process of a market without prior exposure to MAOs. Second, we do not observe significant differences between market reaction to non‐GAAP‐ and GAAP‐violation‐related MAOs. Third, no significant difference is found between market reaction to qualified opinions and market reaction to unqualified opinions with explanatory notes.

This paper examines the linkages between discretionary accruals (DAs), managerial share ownership, management compensation, and audit fees. It draws on the theory that managers of firms with high management ownership are likely to use DAs to communicate value‐relevant information, while managers of firms with high accounting‐based compensation are likely to use DAs opportunistically to manage earnings to improve their compensation. OLS regression results of 648 Australian firms show that (1) there is a positive association between DAs and audit fees; (2) managerial ownership negatively affects the positive relationship between DAs and audit fees; and (3) this negative impact is further found to be weaker for firms with high accounting‐based management compensation.

We examine how the rent-seeking incentives of local government motivate private firms11In this paper “private firms” refers to listed non state-owned-enterprises, the ultimate controlling shareholder of which is an individual. listed in China to establish political connections, and whether such connections lead to more concentrated corporate control structures. Our results show that such firms are more likely to establish political connections in regions in which the local economy is less market-oriented or in which the government has more discretion in allocating economic resources. This is consistent with the notion that the presence of incentives for government officials to engage in rent seeking motivates private firms to look for alternative safeguards through political connections. We also find that the controlling owners of politically connected firms tend to concentrate their shareholdings and dominate the board of directors by occupying the position of either chairman or CEO, which supports the conjecture that a concentrated control structure facilitates rent seeking through political connections and allows the controlling owner to retain all of the benefits arising from connections with politicians.