Theory suggests that unhealthy banks exhibit more pronounced flight-to-quality behavior during financial crises and, hence, the infusion of capital through unhealthy banks is less effective in relieving the liquidity shocks of vulnerable borrowers. We test these predictions by investigating how the financial health of leading US banks influenced their borrowers’ credit risk surrounding the announcement of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Changes in borrower credit risk, measured by credit default swap (CDS) spreads, should reflect the expected relief from liquidity shocks and other benefits of rescuing banks, such as maintaining the existing lending relationships. Consistent with the theory, prior to the TARP capital infusions, unhealthy banks’ borrowers with high leverage experienced a greater increase in their credit risk relative to similar healthy banks’ borrowers. Following the event, the CDS market anticipated less liquidity relief to these vulnerable unhealthy banks’ borrowers, but more liquidity relief to the vulnerable healthy banks’ borrowers.

This article provides evidence that firm value declines when credit default swaps (CDSs) are initiated and that the effect is greater when CDS trading activity is higher. This decline, which arises from an increase in the cost of capital as opposed to a decrease in free cash flows, traces to a deterioration in the firm’s credit quality and stock liquidity. Firm value declines less when CDS trading is likely to produce incremental information, suggesting that CDS trading has informational benefits for firm value. However, the evidence does not indicate that firm value increases because CDS availability facilitates investments.

We study how investors in the US municipal bond market price the state lockdowns announced during the coronavirus (COVID) pandemic. To begin with, we examine the extent to which state-level COVID developments influence yield spreads of municipal bonds. We find that macro-level factors are the primary determinants of municipal bond spreads during the pandemic, but state-level COVID developments also matter at the margin. For instance, a doubling of new COVID cases in a state is associated with a 2% (1.4 basis points) increase in yield spreads of municipal bonds issued in that state. Accordingly, lockdowns may decrease municipal bond spreads by reducing COVID cases, but lockdowns may also increase them by reducing local economic activities. Overall, we find that yield spreads in both primary and secondary municipal bond markets increase by about 15% following lockdown announcements, suggesting that lockdown announcements increase the risk premiums investors require for holding municipal bonds.

We study how investors in the US municipal bond market price the state lockdowns announced during the coronavirus (COVID) pandemic. To begin with, we examine the extent to which state-level COVID developments influence yield spreads of municipal bonds. We find that macro-level factors are the primary determinants of municipal bond spreads during the pandemic, but state-level COVID developments also matter at the margin. For instance, a doubling of new COVID cases in a state is associated with a 2% (1.4 basis points) increase in yield spreads of municipal bonds issued in that state. Accordingly, lockdowns may decrease municipal bond spreads by reducing COVID cases, but lockdowns may also increase them by reducing local economic activities. Overall, we find that yield spreads in both primary and secondary municipal bond markets increase by about 15% following lockdown announcements, suggesting that lockdown announcements increase the risk premiums investors require for holding municipal bonds.

Empty creditors—bondholders hedged with Credit Default Swaps (CDSs)—face incentives to holdout from “Distressed Exchanges” (DEs) of debt because the CDS hedge alters their payoffs to favor bankruptcy. We show using detailed data on DEs that firms respond to this holdout problem by targeting junior bondholders who are more likely to tender than senior bondholders. Furthermore, we show that doing so allows them to successfully reduce debt through the DE and avoid bankruptcy. Our evidence underscores the importance of the firm's response to the holdout problem in understanding the role of empty creditors in distress resolution.

Abstract The average maturity of newly issued corporate bonds has declined substantially over the past 40 years, and the traditional determinants of debt maturity fail to explain this decline fully. We show that the changing composition of investors in the corporate bond market influences bond maturities. The results of a Granger causality test, an instrumental variable approach, and a natural experiment suggest that a decline in the insurance companies’ – which prefer long-term bonds – ownership share in the corporate bond market explains a significant part of the unexplained maturity decline. These findings illustrate how investor preferences can have real effects on corporations.