This article analyzes an important aspect of the contemporary reorganization of work within firms: the shift from “Tayloristic” organization (characterized by specialization by tasks) to “holistic” organization (featuring job rotation, integration of tasks, and learning across tasks). We examine four driving forces behind this restructuring process: advances in production technologies promoting technological task complementarities, advances in information technologies promoting informational task complementarities, changes in worker preferences in favor of versatile work, and advances in human capital that make workers more versatile. Our analysis also helps explain the recent widening of wage differentials and disparities in job opportunities within narrowly defined groups.

The paper analyzes an important aspect of the contemporary reorganization of work within firms: the shift from “Tayloristic” organization (characterized by specialization by tasks) to “holistic” organization (featuring job rotation, integration of tasks and learning across tasks). We examine four driving forces behind this restructuring process: advances in production technologies promoting technological task complementarities, advances in information technologies promoting informational task complementarities, changes in worker preferences in favor of versatile work, and advances in human capital that make workers more versatile. Our analysis can also help explain the recent widening of wage differentials and disparities in job opportunities, not only between occupational, educational, and industry groups, but also within these groups. We are indebted to Michael Orszag for his insightful comments, and have benefited from the suggestions of Ruth Klinov, Reuben Gronau, Eric Mellander, Torsten Persson, Jorgen Weibull, and seminar participants at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the Industrial Institute for Economic and Social Research (Stockholm), the Institute for International Economic Studies (Stockholm), and an anonymous referee. We have profited from discussions with Solveig Wikstrom on the reorganization of firms, and are grateful to Jorgen Nilsson for drawing the figures. MULTI-TASK LEARNING AND THE REORGANIZATION OF WORK 1

This paper analyzes the market for syndicated loans, a hybrid of private and public debt, which has grown at well over a 20% rate annually over the past decade and which totaled over $1 trillion in 1997. We identify empirically the factors that influence a bank or nonbank's decision to syndicate a loan and the determinants of the proportion of the loan sold in the event of syndication. The evidence reveals a loan is more likely to be syndicated as information about the borrower becomes more transparent, as the syndicate's managing agent becomes more “reputable”, and as the loan's maturity increases. The lead manager holds larger proportions of information-problematic loans in its own portfolio. Loan syndications, like loan sales, appear to be motivated, in part, by capital regulations, and the liquidity position of the agent bank influences the likelihood of syndication, but not the extent. Our results confirm that information and agency problems affect the salability of debt claims and the extent to which a loan is “transaction oriented” rather than “relationship oriented” in the sense of A. Boot and A. Thakor (2000, J. Finance54, 679–713). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, G20, G21, G24.

Some companies now outsource their internal audit function to public accountants. Internal auditors and accounting firms disagree about the merits of outsourcing. Each type of auditor claims to provide more cost‐effective services and appears to claim superior expertise. This paper uses agency theory to examine outsourcing and reconciles the outsourcing debate without resorting to differential auditor expertise. Under the assumptions that public accountants' “deep pockets” provide incentives to outsource and their higher opportunity cost provides a disincentive, we characterize the optimal employment contract with each auditor. We find that public accountants provide higher levels of testing, but possibly for a higher expected fee. This result supports both the internal auditor's claim as the lower cost provider, and the public accountant's claim of higher quality. We also find that incentives to outsource generally increase in various measures of risk, including the risk that a control weakness exists and the size of the loss that can result from an undetected control weakness.

Some companies now outsource their internal audit function to public accountants. Internal auditors and accounting firms disagree about the merits of outsourcing. Each type of auditor claims to provide more cost-effective services and appears to claim superior expertise. This paper uses agency theory to examine outsourcing and reconciles the outsourcing debate without resorting to differential auditor expertise. Under the assumptions that public accountants' “deep pockets” provide incentives to outsource and their higher opportunity cost provides a disincentive, we characterize the optimal employment contract with each auditor. We find that public accountants provide higher levels of testing, but possibly for a higher expected fee. This result supports both the internal auditor's claim as the lower cost provider, and the public accountant's claim of higher quality. We also find that incentives to outsource generally increase in various measures of risk, including the risk that a control weakness exists and the size of the loss that can result from an undetected control weakness.

For 20 years following 1949, average total fertility per woman in China hovered just above six children. The year 1970 marked the beginning of persistent fertility declines. By 1980, the rate had dropped to 2.75, and since 1992 it has remained under 2. While some of this transition can be accounted for by broad socioeconomic developments, the extent to which it is attributable to China's unique population policies remains controversial. This paper analyzes household data from the 1992 Household Economy and Fertility Survey (HEFS) to provide the first direct microeconomic empirical evidence on the efficacy of these policies.

Steven Dennis, Debarshi Nandy, Ian G. Sharpe, The Determinants of Contract Terms in Bank Revolving Credit Agreements, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Mar., 2000), pp. 87-110

Jennifer Francis, Per Olsson, Dennis R. Oswald, Comparing the Accuracy and Explainability of Dividend, Free Cash Flow, and Abnormal Earnings Equity Value Estimates, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Spring, 2000), pp. 45-70

Direct measures of labor-force quality from international mathematics and science test scores are strongly related to growth. Indirect specification tests are generally consistent with a causal link: direct spending on schools is unrelated to student performance differences; the estimated growth effects of improved labor-force quality hold when East Asian countries are excluded; and, finally, home-country quality differences of immigrants are directly related to U.S. earnings if the immigrants are educated in their own country but not in the United States. The last estimates of micro productivity effects, however, introduce uncertainty about the magnitude of the growth effects.