This paper establishes a new empirical fact: Mutual funds' flow-performance sensitivity is a hump-shaped function of aggregate risk-factor realizations. Explanations based on extant theories can explain only a fraction of the pattern. We thus develop a new parsimonious model. It assumes Bayesian investors who are uncertain about the degree to which fund returns are exposed to systematic risk. Fund performance is then less informative about manager skill when factor realizations are larger in absolute value. The data also support the out-of-sample prediction that the hump shape is more pronounced for funds with more uncertain risk loadings.

Mandatory contributions to defined benefit pension plans provide a unique identification strategy to estimate the market's assessment of the value of internal resources controlling for investment opportunities. The price decrease following a pension-induced drop in cash is magnified for firms that appear a priori more financially constrained, suggesting a negative effect of financing frictions on investment. In contrast, low control on managerial discretion attenuates the negative price reaction to contributions consistent with empire-building theories. While overinvestment seems to be the prevalent distortion in a panel of large firms, underinvestment appears to dominate in a sample that is more representative of the cross-section of listed companies.

[Hedge funds significantly reduced their equity holdings during the recent financial crisis. In 2008: Q3-Q4, hedge funds sold about 29% of their aggregate portfolio. Redemptions and margin calls were the primary drivers of selloffs. Consistent with forced deleveraging, the selloffs took place in volatile and liquid stocks. In comparison, redemptions and stock sales for mutual funds were not as severe. We show that hedge fund investors withdraw capital three times as intensely as mutual fund investors do in response to poor returns. We relate this stronger sensitivity to losses to share liquidity restrictions and institutional ownership in hedge funds.]

We estimate a structural model of broker choice to quantitatively decompose the value that institutional investors attach to broker services. Studying over 300 million institutional equity trades, we find that investors are sensitive to both explicit and implicit trading costs and are willing to pay a premium for access to formal and informal research. Formal and informal research account for roughly half of the value generated by brokers. In addition, we use our model to investigate soft dollar arrangements, where research and execution services are bundled, and find that such arrangements allow hedge funds and mutual funds to underreport management fees by 10%.

This paper explores how affiliation to financial conglomerates affects asset managers’ access to capital, risk taking, and performance. Focusing on a sample of hedge funds, we find that financial conglomerate-affiliated hedge funds (FCAHFs) have lower flow-performance sensitivity than other hedge funds and that this difference is particularly pronounced during financial turmoil. Arguably, thanks to more stable funding, FCAHFs allow their investors to redeem capital more freely and are able to capture price rebounds. Because investors could value these characteristics, our findings provide a rationale for why financial conglomerate affiliation is widespread, although it slightly hampers performance on average.

This paper establishes a new empirical fact: Mutual funds’ flow-performance sensitivity is a hump-shaped function of aggregate risk-factor realizations. Explanations based on extant theories can explain only a fraction of the pattern. We thus develop a new parsimonious model. It assumes Bayesian investors who are uncertain about the degree to which fund returns are exposed to systematic risk. Fund performance is then less informative about manager skill when factor realizations are larger in absolute value. The data also support the out-of-sample prediction that the hump shape is more pronounced for funds with more uncertain risk loadings.Received October 24, 2014; editorial decision October 11, 2016 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

The article studies liquidity provision by institutional investors using trade-level data. We find that hedge fund trades are a more important predictor of stock-level liquidity than mutual fund trades. However, hedge funds’ liquidity provision is more exposed to financial conditions than that of mutual funds. Hedge funds that are more constrained in terms of leverage, age, asset illiquidity, and past performance exhibit a stronger shift toward liquidity consumption when funding condition tighten. Stocks with more exposure to constrained liquidity providing hedge funds suffered more during the financial crisis.

Hedge funds significantly reduced their equity holdings during the recent financial crisis. In 2008:Q3––Q4, hedge funds sold about 29% of their aggregate portfolio. Redemptions and margin calls were the primary drivers of selloffs. Consistent with forced deleveraging, the selloffs took place in volatile and liquid stocks. In comparison, redemptions and stock sales for mutual funds were not as severe. We show that hedge fund investors withdraw capital three times as intensely as mutual fund investors do in response to poor returns. We relate this stronger sensitivity to losses to share liquidity restrictions and institutional ownership in hedge funds.

The paper argues that the market significantly overvalues firms with severely underfunded pension plans. These companies earn lower stock returns than firms with healthier pension plans for at least 5 years after the first emergence of the underfunding. The low returns are not explained by risk, price momentum, earnings momentum, or accruals. Further, the evidence suggests that investors do not anticipate the impact of the pension liability on future earnings, and they are surprised when the negative implications of underfunding ultimately materialize. Finally, underfunded firms have poor operating performance, and they earn low returns, although they are value companies.