With the advent of social media, individual public opinions about fi rms can be more easily accessed and aggregated, and recent research suggests that various platforms, such as Twitter, Seeking Alpha, and Estimize, provide information relevant in predicting future corporate disclosures. Rather than focusing on the general public's opinion, we examine a public platform designed to convey insider information - Glassdoor.com, where employees voluntarily share their opinions on a number of issues, including the company's near-term business outlook. Using a sample of approximately 150,000 employee reviews, we extract both employees' explicit assessments of outlook and a measure of their latent outlook derived from factor analysis. We then examine whether the opinions employees share on social media relate to future corporate disclosures. In particular, we fi nd evidence that employee opinions are useful in predicting growth in key income statement information, transitory reporting items (e.g., restructuring charges), earnings surprises, and management forecast news. While voluntary disclosures about fi rm performance have traditionally come from executives, our evidence suggests that rank-and-fi le employees are chipping away at upper-level management's exclusive control over that channel.

The FASB recently issued ASU 2024-03, which requires disaggregation of significant expenses, like cost of goods sold (COGS) and selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses. Proponents argue disaggregation will improve decision usefulness, whereas opponents suggest the information will be costly and provide little value. We provide large-sample evidence on the pre-ASU state of expense disaggregation, analyze whether it appears to provide decision-useful information, and explore differences across disaggregation components. Our findings suggest that disaggregation is relatively common, increasing over time, and correlated with demand for disclosure, disclosure incentives, and firm economics. Further, our evidence is consistent with COGS, but not SG&A, disaggregation providing decision-useful information for investors and analysts, and these benefits accrue via improved processing of expense-related news. Overall, our evidence suggests that not all disaggregation is equal. We also identify novel, large-sample expense disaggregation measures for U.S. firms, which are likely useful for evaluating other implications of disaggregation. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

In response to the increasing use of computer programs to process firm disclosures, this registered report develops a new measure of “scriptability” that reflects computerized, rather than human, information processing costs. We validate our measure using SEC filing‐derived data from prior research and identify firm and disclosure characteristics related to it. In our planned hypothesis tests, we find some evidence that the speed of the market response to filings increases with scriptability, but find little evidence that scriptability affects the incidence and speed of news dissemination by Dow Jones. In additional analyses, we find that scriptability exhibits both positive and negative associations with changes in information asymmetry between market participants, depending on the filing, trading window, and measure examined. We also find little evidence that XBRL interacts with scriptability in a meaningful way. Overall, our study broadens our understanding of information processing costs and provides opportunities for new avenues of research.

We examine the association between employee quality and financial reporting outcomes. Using the average workforce education level in MSA(s) where the firm operates as a proxy for employee quality, we find that firms with a high-quality workforce exhibit higher accruals quality, fewer internal control violations, and fewer restatements. These firms also issue superior management forecasts, in terms of frequency, timeliness, accuracy, precision, and bias. Employees located at the firm's headquarters primarily drive our findings. Our evidence suggests employee quality, particularly at a firm's headquarters, is associated with both mandatory and voluntary disclosure quality.

Research has long recognized that institutional investors possess significant information processing advantages. Yet even these investors face limited‐attention constraints, implying that periods of distraction may attenuate their advantage. We examine the effects of a plausibly exogenous shock to institutional attention arising from the annual buy‐side‐focused Equity Research and Valuation (ERV) conference for Chartered Financial Analysts on institutions' information processing at earnings announcements. Validation tests using conference call data indicate that fewer buy‐side analysts are present on earnings calls during ERV conferences and that questions are shorter, consistent with the presence of substitute or backup analysts. In our main analyses, we find that buy‐side analyst inattention reduces information asymmetry among investors and improves liquidity at these earnings announcements, consistent with theory, and observe similar results for non–earnings announcement events. In additional tests, we document slower price formation, but also more profitable retail trading, during these periods. Collectively, we provide novel evidence on the market consequences of institutional inattention during key information events.

The executive compensation literature presumes that shareholders offer risk‐averse managers stock options to entice them to take on more risk, resulting in riskier investment decisions and thus a greater return on investment. However, recent empirical work challenges this assumption, and theoretical research even argues that high levels of option‐based compensation for generally under‐diversified managers may actually lead to greater risk aversion . We evaluate the incentive structure of employee stock options by examining the level of R&D investment and the return on that investment conditional on the portfolio “vega,” which captures the sensitivity of option value to stock price volatility. Our results suggest that both investment in R&D and the return on R&D, as measured by future earnings and patent awards, varies concavely with vega. That is, low to moderate levels of vega correspond to increasing investment in and returns on R&D, consistent with vega inducing more profitable investments, but marginal returns decline as vega increases. Collectively, these results, bolstered by several supplemental analyses, suggest that this surprising relation between vega and risky investment is driven by greater risk aversion at higher levels of vega. Overall, our results imply that employee stock options may not always align the incentives of managers and shareholders.

Despite the intuitive appeal, prior research finds mixed evidence on whether higher audit fees translate to superior audit quality. Under the assumption that product differentiation between auditors is based, in large part, on the level of financial statement assurance, we propose more refined measures of excess audit fees that separate auditor premiums from other fee premiums. Consistent with our conjecture, we identify significant variation in audit pricing across auditors (i.e., auditor premiums) that relates positively to audit quality. Conversely, we find no evidence that higher engagement‐specific fee premiums (i.e., fee model residuals) are positively related to proxies for audit quality. Additional tests indicate that our results do not simply reflect premiums attributable to auditor characteristics evaluated in prior research (e.g., Big 4 membership, office size, and industry expertise). In fact, our findings suggest that the positive association between auditor premiums and audit quality is better captured at the auditor level than it is at the auditor “tier,” office, auditor‐industry, or engagement levels. In sum, our results suggest that auditors charging higher fees, on average, deliver superior levels of financial statement assurance, but engagement‐specific fee premiums do not reflect quality‐enhancing audit effort. These contrasting results provide a possible explanation for the mixed findings in prior research.