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Optimal design of rating-trigger step-up bonds: Agency conflicts versus asymmetric information

Journal of Corporate Finance 2010 16(2), 182-204
Agency conflicts and asymmetric information are two possible explanations that may rationalize the use of a step-up provision in the bond indenture. Within a continuous-time framework with bankruptcy costs and tax benefits, we analyze the optimal step-up bond design with respect to both frictions. We find that (i) contrary to existing results, step-up bonds are indeed able to mitigate the asset substitution problem, (ii) the use of a step-up feature can be a credible signal to overcome asymmetric information problems, and (iii) the optimal design as well as the conditions for the optimal use of step-up bonds is considerably different for the two explanations. This outcome implies that, based on observable firm and bond characteristics, it is possible to discriminate between the two motives underlying the use of step-up bonds.

Firm size effects in trade credit supply and demand

Journal of Banking & Finance 2018 93, 1-20
By investigating trade credit usage among SMEs and large companies following the macroeconomic shock of the financial crisis of 2007/08, we identify a firm size effect, which is genuine in the sense that it cannot be entirely explained by financial constraints, external finance dependence or creditworthiness. We find that (i) SMEs, in contrast to large firms, do not display evidence for the inter-firm liquidity redistribution hypothesis. Especially large vulnerable firms did cut down trade credit provision to the detriment of small vulnerable firms. (ii) We document a general substitution effect between bank and trade credit and show that it has strengthened during the crisis among large firms, but not among SMEs. (iii) We provide evidence that the shift in trade credit financing had adverse real effects on investment behaviour of SMEs.

Contingent convertibles. Solving or seeding the next banking crisis?

Journal of Banking & Finance 2012 36(1), 90-104
A recent proposal to enhance banking stability recommends the use of contingent convertibles (CoCos). Since these hybrid securities are mandatorily converted into equity when banks are in need of a recapitalization, they are credited for reducing banks’ likelihood of financial distress. In this paper, we show within a continuous-time framework that this allegedly beneficial impact hinges critically on the assumption of complete contracts. If contracts are incomplete in the sense that manager–owners enjoy discretion over the risk of the investment program, our analysis shows that CoCo bonds always distort risk taking incentives. Our main contribution is to demonstrate that there exist conditions under which CoCo bond financing increases investors’ wealth, but also increases the bank’s probability of financial distress, so that the banking system as a whole will be destabilized. Thus, individually rational decisions can have systemically undesirable outcomes. Further results indicate that CoCos should be used only in conjunction with devices to control risk shifting incentives.

What makes a bank risky? Insights from the optimal capital structure of banks

Journal of Banking & Finance 2009 33(5), 861-873
Assessing the risk of bank failures is the paramount concern of bank regulation. This paper argues that in order to assess the default risk of a bank, it is important to consider its financing decisions as an endogenous dynamic process. We provide a continuous-time model, where banks choose the deposit volume in order to trade off the benefits of earning deposit premiums against the costs that occur at future capital structure adjustments. The bank’s asset value may suffer from shocks and follows a jump-diffusion process. Our main finding is that the dynamic endogenous financing decision introduces an important self-regulation mechanism, where it is crucial to distinguish between the diffusion risk and the jump risk component.