[This article tests financial contagion due to interbank linkages. For identification, we exploit an idiosyncratic, sudden shock caused by a large-bank failure in conjunction with detailed data on interbank exposures. First, we find robust evidence that higher interbank exposure to the failed bank leads to large deposit withdrawals. Second, the magnitude of contagion is higher for banks with weaker fundamentals. Third, interbank linkages among surviving banks further propagate the shock. Finally, we find results suggesting that there are real economic effects. These results suggest that interbank linkages act as an important channel of contagion and hold important policy implications.]

[Using a unique dataset of the Euro-area and the U.S. bank lending standards, we find that low (monetary policy) short-term interest rates soften standards for household and corporate loans. This softening—especially for mortgages—is amplified by securitization activity, weak supervision for bank capital, and low monetary policy rates for an extended period. Conversely, low long-term interest rates do not soften lending standards. Finally, countries with softer lending standards before the crisis related to negative Taylor rule residuals experienced a worse economic performance afterward. These results help shed light on the origins of the crisis and have important policy implications.]

Using a unique dataset of the Euro-area and the U.S. bank lending standards, we find that low (monetary policy) short-term interest rates soften standards for household and corporate loans. This softening—especially for mortgages—is amplified by securitization activity, weak supervision for bank capital, and low monetary policy rates for an extended period. Conversely, low long-term interest rates do not soften lending standards. Finally, countries with softer lending standards before the crisis related to negative Taylor rule residuals experienced a worse economic performance afterward. These results help shed light on the origins of the crisis and have important policy implications.

We identify the effects of monetary policy on credit risk-taking with an exhaustive credit register of loan applications and contracts. We separate the changes in the composition of the supply of credit from the concurrent changes in the volume of supply and quality, and the volume of demand. We employ a two-stage model that analyzes the granting of loan applications in the first stage and loan outcomes for the applications granted in the second stage, and that controls for both observed and unobserved, time-varying, firm and bank heterogeneity through time*firm and time*bank fixed effects. We find that a lower overnight interest rate induces lowly capitalized banks to grant more loan applications to ex ante risky firms and to commit larger loan volumes with fewer collateral requirements to these firms, yet with a higher ex post likelihood of default. A lower long-term interest rate and other relevant macroeconomic variables have no such effects.

We study the effects of both tighter and looser bank capital requirements on bank risk-taking. We exploit credit register data matched with firm and bank level data in conjunction with changes in capital requirements stemming from Basel III, including the introduction of a SME supporting bank capital factor in the European Union. We find that tighter capital requirements reduce the supply of bank credit to firms, while looser capital requirements mitigate the credit supply effects of increasing capital. Importantly, at the loan level (credit supply), banks more affected by capital requirements change less the supply of credit to riskier than to safer firms, and these asymmetric effects occur for both the tightening and the loosening of bank capital requirements. Finally, these effects are also important at the firm-level for total credit availability and for firm survival. Interestingly, our results suggest that those banks most impacted by the tighter Basel III capital requirements prioritize credit among ex-ante riskier firms to avoid their closure, consistent with loan evergreening.

We show that a U‐shaped monetary rate path increases banking crisis risk, via credit and asset price cycles, analyzing 17 countries over 150 years. Rate hikes (raw or instrumented) increase crisis risk, but only if preceded by prolonged cuts. These patterns are unique to banking crises, unlike noncrisis recessions. Regarding the mechanism, prolonged cuts raise the likelihood of large credit and asset price booms, consistent with higher credit supply and risk‐taking. Subsequent hikes strongly reduce credit and asset prices, and increase banks' realized credit risk, rather than interest rate risk. We find consistent results in administrative loan‐level data for Spain.

We study the credit supply effects of the unexpected freeze of the European interbank market, using exhaustive Portuguese loan-level data. We find that banks that rely more on interbank borrowing before the crisis decrease their credit supply more during the crisis. The credit supply reduction is stronger for firms that are smaller, with weaker banking relationships. Small firms cannot compensate the credit crunch with other sources of debt. Furthermore, the impact of illiquidity on the credit crunch is stronger for less solvent banks. Finally, we find no overall positive effects of central bank liquidity but instead higher hoarding of liquidity.

We study how firm-level carbon emissions affect bank lending and real outcomes in a sample of global firms with syndicated loans. We exploit bank-level climate commitments as firm-level shocks to lending relationships, using firms' prior credit exposures to identify credit supply effects. Firms with higher emissions that previously borrowed from committed banks receive less bank credit. Evidence from lending volumes, prices, and within-firm-time loan-level data indicates a supply-side shift away from high-emission firms, not explained by borrower risk. Affected firms reduce debt, leverage, size, and investment, yet we find no reduction in future emissions, instead documenting evidence consistent with greenwashing.

This article tests financial contagion due to interbank linkages. For identification, we exploit an idiosyncratic, sudden shock caused by a large-bank failure in conjunction with detailed data on interbank exposures. First, we find robust evidence that higher interbank exposure to the failed bank leads to large deposit withdrawals. Second, the magnitude of contagion is higher for banks with weaker fundamentals. Third, interbank linkages among surviving banks further propagate the shock. Finally, we find results suggesting that there are real economic effects. These results suggest that interbank linkages act as an important channel of contagion and hold important policy implications.

We analyze the impact of financial globalization on business cycle synchronization using a proprietary database on banks’ international exposure for industrialized countries during 1978 to 2006. Theory makes ambiguous predictions and identification has been elusive due to lack of bilateral time‐varying financial linkages data. In contrast to conventional wisdom and previous empirical studies, we identify a strong negative effect of banking integration on output synchronization, conditional on global shocks and country‐pair heterogeneity. Similarly, we show divergent economic activity due to higher integration using an exogenous de‐jure measure of integration based on financial regulations that harmonized EU markets.