This paper examines whether laws requiring oil and gas firms to disclose the chemicals used in their fracking operations affect the mortgage lending activity for properties located in nearby areas. I hypothesize and find that the disclosure mandate reduces uncertainty about the value of housing collateral and subsequently increases (1) the probability of obtaining a mortgage by 2.5 percentage points (pp), and (2) loan-to-value by 2.2 pp. My main analyses exploit the variation in the location of properties relative to fracking wells. Cross-sectional tests that exploit heterogeneity in drinking water sources and the content of firm disclosures further substantiate my inferences and mitigate endogeneity concerns. These findings suggest that disclosure regulation for oil and gas firms affects housing collateral values, thereby impacting the mortgage market.

We study whether mandatory surveys of patient experience affects patient mortality in U.S. hospitals. We exploit two settings where healthcare regulators mandated the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) survey: the 2003 Maryland pilot study and the 2007 nationwide adoption. Difference-indifferences analyses show increased mortality for hospitals that were subject to the mandate, relative to other comparable hospitals. We observe this effect before hospitals disclose their HCAHPS ratings, which suggests that it is attributable to measurement, rather than to disclosure. An analysis of changes in hospital expenses shows that, after the mandate, affected hospitals experienced a relative increase (decrease) in non-clinical (clinical) expenses. This finding is consistent with theories of multitasking, which predict that more incentives for one task (in this case, patient experience) cause some reallocation of resources from other tasks (clinical care).