In this paper, we examine how the value of failed bank assets differs between two types of FDIC resolution methods: liquidation and private-sector reorganization. Our findings show that private-sector reorganizations do not deliver the expected cost-savings from 1986 to 1991, a period of industry distress. On a univariate basis, the net loss on assets is lower for a private-sector reorganization than for a liquidation in both a period of industry distress and of industry health. However, institutions with higher quality assets and higher franchise values are more likely to be resolved using a private-sector resolution. Once we control for this selection bias, we find that institutions that are resolved during periods of industry distress result in higher resolution costs than liquidation. During periods of industry health, private-sector resolutions are less costly than liquidations. We show that if a bank that failed during the post-crisis period instead failed during the crisis period, its net loss as a percent of assets would have been 3.232 percentage points higher. Given that the average net loss on assets ratio is 21.42 percent during our sample period from 1986 to 2007, the increase in costs is economically significant.

Abstract We present a dynamic rational expectations model of closed-end fund discounts that incorporates feedback effects from activist arbitrage and lifeboats. Both activist arbitrage and lifeboats distort closed-end fund prices and lead to narrower discounts. Furthermore, both activist arbitrage and lifeboats effectuate an ex post wealth transfer from managers to investors but an ex ante wealth transfer from low-ability managers to high-ability managers. On average, investor wealth is unaffected by either activist arbitrage or lifeboats because their potential benefits are factored into higher fund prices. Although lifeboats can reduce takeover attempts, they do not increase expected managerial wealth.

We investigate the effect of political connections in Italy, for each level of government, on the credit markets and we find robust evidence that politically connected firms benefit from lower interest rates when the political link is at a local level. Our results show that this preferential treatment is stronger when connected firms borrow from banks with politicians on their boards and when the degree of autonomy granted to local loan officers is higher. The latter result provides a novel addition to the literature on the effects of the delegation of lending decisions within the bank. We also show that the effect is stronger in geographical areas where the incidence of corruption is higher. Overall, our results show that on aggregate the impact of political connections on interest rates is limited but it may rise significantly in specific (local) situations due to a combination of factors such as the delegation of lending decisions, a weaker rule of law and some governance characteristics of banks.

Building on archival, anecdotal, and survey evidence on managers׳ roles in accounting manipulations, I develop an agency model to examine the effects of a CEO׳s power to pressure a CFO to bias a performance measure, like earnings. This power has implications for incentive compensation, reporting quality, firm value, and information rents. Predictions from the model provide potential explanations for the differing results from recent empirical studies on the impact of regulatory interventions like SOX and the extent to which the CEO׳s or CFO׳s incentives significantly impact on earnings management. The model also identifies conditions under which either a powerful or a non-powerful CEO can extract rents, which can help explain mixed empirical results on the association between CEO power and “excessive” compensation.

We analyze the impact of the introduction of the French Tobin tax on the turnover and measures of the liquidity and volatility of the affected stocks with nonparametric tests on individual stocks, difference-in-difference tests and other robustness checks controlling for simultaneous month-of-the-year and size effects. Our findings indicate that the tax produces a significant reduction in turnover and volatility (measured in terms of stock price volatility and the high–low price range) and inconclusive effects on liquidity when the latter is evaluated under the two dimensions of the estimated bid–ask spread and the Amihud (2002) price impact ratio.

We develop a decentralized Bayesian model of college admissions with two ranked colleges, heterogeneous students, and two realistic match frictions: students find it costly to apply to college, and college evaluations of their applications are uncertain. Students thus face a portfolio choice problem in their application decision, while colleges choose admissions standards that act like market-clearing prices. Enrollment at each college is affected by the standards at the other college through student portfolio reallocation. In equilibrium, student-college sorting may fail: weaker students sometimes apply more aggressively, and the weaker college might impose higher standards. Applying our framework, we analyse affirmative action, showing how it induces minority applicants to construct their application portfolios as if they were majority students of higher caliber.

We model the risk of setting the required fixed-offer price in an IPO given initial uncertainty about value, as well as costs of over and underpricing. Assuming that the goal of issuers in bookbuilt IPOs is to maximize net offering proceeds, our analysis indicates that their optimal strategy is to negotiate a relatively small spread, consistent with material underpricing. Similarly, considering the expected costs of overpricing makes the underpricing of best-efforts IPOs in the interest of issuers. Our results rely on neither asymmetric information nor agency costs and provide support for Hansen's (2001) nearly-optimal “conventional” spread and the view that it evolved from adaptive, imitative behavior, consistent with Alchian's (1950) explanation of how economic players evolve practices to survive under uncertainty and incomplete information, as well as Alchian's (1969) work on how fixed prices and queues can efficiently clear product markets.

A wide body of empirical evidence finds that around 25 percent of fiscal stimulus payments (e.g., tax rebates) are spent on nondurable household consumption in the quarter that they are received.To interpret this fact, we develop a structural economic model where households can hold two assets: a low-return liquid asset (e.g., cash, checking account) and a high-return illiquid asset that carries a transaction cost (e.g., housing, retirement account).The optimal life-cycle pattern of portfolio choice implies that many households in the model are "wealthy hand-to-mouth": they hold little or no liquid wealth despite owning sizeable quantities of illiquid assets.They therefore display large propensities to consume out of additional transitory income, and small propensities to consume out of news about future income.We document the existence of such households in data from the Survey of Consumer Finances.A version of the model parameterized to the 2001 tax rebate episode yields consumption responses to fiscal stimulus payments that are in line with the evidence, and an order of magnitude larger than in the standard "one-asset" framework.The model's nonlinearities with respect to the size of the rebate, its degree of phasing-out, and aggregate economic conditions have implications for policy design.

Using a strategic rational expectations equilibrium framework, we show that forcing a well-informed insider to disclose her trades in advance tends to increase welfare for both the insider and less-informed outsiders. Advance disclosure generates price risk for the insider, and to mitigate this risk, the insider trades less aggressively on her private information. Consequently, outsiders face lower adverse selection costs, which improves risk sharing and increases welfare. The drop in trading aggressiveness also causes market efficiency to decline. Furthermore, pretrade disclosure encourages excessive risk taking but may either encourage or discourage managerial effort.