Abstract Auditors' professional judgements are typically made following a discussion of contentious issues with other auditors (Gibbins and Mason 1988). These discussions may be with others at various levels in the hierarchy of the audit firm, with informal discussion with peers often taking place prior to formal discussions with audit supervisors (see, e.g., Solomon 1987). This study uses an experiment, involving 286 public accountants, to consider how discussion with peers may influence auditors' subsequent resolution of realistic audit‐specific moral dilemmas. Auditors were asked to prescriptively discuss how an accountant ideally should resolve a moral dilemma, or to deliberatively discuss how an accountant actually would resolve a moral dilemma. The results showed that auditors have higher moral reasoning scores after prescriptive discussion with peers and lower moral reasoning scores after deliberative discussion with peers. Thus, the study findings point to the significance of discussion of contentious dilemmas with peers and the importance of type of discussion for predicting and explaining auditors' moral reasoning. More specifically, the results indicate that discussion with peers may provide information and/or signal what is important and acceptable to the resolution of a moral dilemma, which facilitates transformation of an auditor's moral reasoning. This suggests the importance of informal mechanisms, such as peer discussion, as part of the social control system in audit firms.

Auditors' professional judgements are typically made following a discussion of contentious issues with other auditors (Gibbins and Mason 1988). These discussions may be with others at various levels in the hierarchy of the audit firm, with informal discussion with peers often taking place prior to formal discussions with audit supervisors (see, e.g., Solomon 1987). This study uses an experiment, involving 286 public accountants, to consider how discussion with peers may influence auditors' subsequent resolution of realistic audit-specific moral dilemmas. Auditors were asked to prescriptively discuss how an accountant ideally should resolve a moral dilemma, or to deliberatively discuss how an accountant actually would resolve a moral dilemma. The results showed that auditors have higher moral reasoning scores after prescriptive discussion with peers and lower moral reasoning scores after deliberative discussion with peers. Thus, the study findings point to the significance of discussion of contentious dilemmas with peers and the importance of type of discussion for predicting and explaining auditors' moral reasoning. More specifically, the results indicate that discussion with peers may provide information and/or signal what is important and acceptable to the resolution of a moral dilemma, which facilitates transformation of an auditor's moral reasoning. This suggests the importance of informal mechanisms, such as peer discussion, as part of the social control system in audit firms.

Abstract Regulators argue that mandated compensation disclosure improves corporate governance by permitting shareholders to enjoin boards of directors to reward executives in ways that are consistent with shareholder value creation. We posit that mandated compensation disclosure, or the absence thereof, has a greater impact on the CEO compensation practices of widely held firms than of closely held firms. More specifically, we expect that, in the absence of mandated disclosure, CEO compensation is likely to be less performance‐contingent among widely held firms than among closely held firms. Moreover, we also expect that the advent of mandated disclosure leads widely held firms to increase the extent to which CEO compensation is performance‐contingent, much more so than closely held firms would. We use a unique data base resulting from the Ontario Securities Commission amendment of regulation 638 in October 1993. For the first time, this amendment required firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange to provide detailed executive compensation data similar to those required by the Securities and Exchange Commission, for the current year as well as retroactively for the previous two years. We find that, in the absence of mandated disclosure, CEO cash compensation in widely held firms is less performance‐contingent than in closely held firms. With the imposition of mandated disclosure, performance‐contingent cash compensation increases more in widely held firms than in closely held firms. Results with respect to stock option grants are mixed, with both closely held and widely held firms reacting to the advent of mandated disclosure.

Abstract This study uses experimental markets to investigate how moral reasoning influences auditor reporting under different levels of economic incentives. In each multiperiod market, auditor subjects could either (1) misreport low observed outcomes as high and thereby reap economic advantages at the expense of third‐party investors, or (2) truthfully report low observed outcomes as low but thereby forgo the economic advantages of misreporting. We extend the Calegari, Schatzberg, and Sevcik 1998 experimental‐markets setting to incorporate moral reasoning, and test hypotheses based on the economic model of Magee and Tseng 1990 and the neo‐Kohlbergian moral reasoning framework of Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, and Thoma 1999. We document a significant effect of moral reasoning on auditor behavior. Specifically, we find that misreporting and premium fees are more likely with higher than with lower moral reasoning subjects, and the moral reasoning effect diminishes as economic penalties increase in the market. These findings provide valuable insights for specifying the determinants of auditor misreporting, the observable behaviors that signal its existence, and the institutions that can prevent its occurrence in the market. We conclude that the relation between moral reasoning and behavior is more complex than commonly assumed in the accounting literature, and identify directions for future research.