Journal Article A Note on Income Velocities Get access Lauchlin Currie Lauchlin Currie Harvard University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 48, Issue 2, February 1934, Pages 353–354, https://doi.org/10.2307/1885614 Published: 01 February 1934

Journal Article Member Bank Reserves and Bank Debits Get access Lauchlin Carrie Lauchlin Carrie Harvard University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 47, Issue 2, February 1933, Pages 349–356, https://doi.org/10.2307/1883694 Published: 01 February 1933

I. Description of method of compilation of an annual series of money, 77.— II. Reliability of various banking series as indexes of change in the money supply, 87.— III. Money supply amenable to Federal Reserve control, 88.— IV. Time deposits, 89.— V. Money, incomes and income velocities, 91.— VI. Money and gold, 92.

Connection between member bank indebtedness and net demand deposits, 509. — Varying degrees of sensitivity to indebtedness according to (a) classes of banks, 511. — (b) business conditions, 516. — Alternative explanations of the movement of net demand deposits: (a) movement of "reserve funds, " 517. — (b) rediscount rate changes, 519. — Summary of argument, 522. — Implications, 522.

Journal Article The Decline of the Commercial Loan Get access Lauchlin Currie Lauchlin Currie Harvard University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 45, Issue 4, August 1931, Pages 698–709, https://doi.org/10.2307/1883250 Published: 01 August 1931

It is generally accepted that the internal and external situation in 1929 posed contradictory demands with respect to monetary policy. According to Currie this is an erroneous point of view. Both the international and national situations of that time demanded the withdLdwa1of monetary restrictions. This, along with the maintenance of relatively stable prices and level of economic activity, could have partially prevented the consequences of a world recession. The argument for maintaining the monetary restriction was the rise in speculation. Nevertheless, it is fl0t clear chat speculation harmed productive investment or much less that it was an important cause of the recession In fact, and contrary to general opinion that maintained that the excesses of the "boom" were to blame for the gravity of the depression, the author shows that the Le was neither a ·'boom" nor inflation during the 1920s. This was, rather, a time of stability. The deficiencies of monetary policy, the concludes, were greatly responsible far originating the crisis. By concentrating primarily on stopping Speculation, the analysis of the level of economic activity as a whole was neglected. Far from preventing the recession, this served to set it off.