We study merger and acquisition (M&A) disclosures made during regularly scheduled earnings calls. These bundled disclosures have been understudied in the literature, which focuses on dedicated M&A calls. Bundled deals represent an economically significant share of merger transactions. Bundling occurs when earnings news is weak. Bundled disclosures produce lower announcement returns by ∼130 basis points and are associated with reduced investor attention relative to dedicated calls. Bundling is more likely when bidders suffer from agency problems, such as powerful CEOs, entrenched boards, and low institutional ownership. In bundled calls, managers discuss the transaction in an optimistic tone that contrasts with the negative tone of the rest of the call. Overall, bundling seems to be an opportunistic attempt to put a positive spin on earnings news, to which analysts respond with skepticism. Our paper contributes to the literature on voluntary disclosure and contains important practical lessons for managers, board members, and market participants.

How does trading in one venue affect the quoting strategies of market makers in other venues? We develop a two-venue imperfect competition model in which market makers face quadratic costs when absorbing shocks. Nonconstant marginal costs imply that absorbing a shock in one venue simultaneously changes marginal costs in all other venues. Moreover, market makers strategically choose which shock(s) to absorb. These two forces may intensify competition, leading to enhanced liquidity. Using Euronext proprietary data, we track individual best bid and ask quotes of intermediaries in each venue. We uncover evidence of strategic cross-venue market-making behavior which is uniquely predicted by our model.