We provide evidence regarding mutual funds’ motivation to hold lottery stocks. Funds with higher managerial ownership invest less in lottery stocks, suggesting that managers themselves do not prefer such stocks. The evidence instead supports that managers cater to fund investors’ preference for such stocks. In particular, funds with more lottery holdings attract larger flows after portfolio disclosure compared with their peers, and poorly performing funds tend to engage in risk shifting by increasing their lottery holdings toward year-ends. Funds’ aggregate holdings of lottery stocks contribute to their overpricing.

Using Internet search volume of dividend-related keywords to measure investor preference for dividends that varies over time and across states, we show that dividend sentiment affects corporate policies and asset prices. Investors search more for dividends when economic conditions are poor, with the peak volume reached during the recent COVID-19 pandemic. Firms initiate or increase dividends when dividend sentiment is stronger, especially in regions with strong dividend sentiment. Shifts in dividend sentiment predict higher investor demand for dividends and higher returns for high dividend stocks. Further, mutual funds that pay high dividends receive more inflows when dividend sentiment is stronger.

We investigate the relationship between investor attention and financial market anomalies. We find that anomaly returns tend to be higher following high-attention days. The result is robust after controlling for the effect of news and in a natural experiment setting in which a stock market regulation and rounding errors generate exogenous variations in attention. An analysis of order imbalances suggests that large traders trade on anomaly signals more aggressively upon observing higher attention. We discuss the extent to which the findings are driven by inattention-driven underreaction, bias amplification, or coordinated arbitrage mechanisms, thereby providing insight into the understanding of anomalies.

Although recent evidence suggests that individual audit partners explain a substantial portion of the variation in audit quality proxies, much less is known about what determines an audit partner's quality. Psychology and behavioral economics theories hold that an individual's experiences can have enduring impacts on subsequent behavior. We examine whether auditors' direct exposure to Arthur Andersen's collapse has a long‐term impact on the quality of their audits. Our evidence implies that audit partners who directly experienced Andersen's demise impose stricter monitoring evident in their clients exhibiting a lower propensity for misstatements and small profits, and paying higher audit fees. Importantly, these findings reconcile with research in finance and economics implying that firsthand experiences matter more to subsequent behavior than general economic conditions or secondhand or thirdhand experiences. Collectively, the results shed light on one facet of how partners' audit quality evolves over time. Our findings suggest that major failures associated with the audit firm in which an auditor works can ultimately result in these affected individuals later delivering higher audit quality, which should benefit audit committees in partner selection decisions and audit firms in designing partner assignment policies.