This paper infers market information embedded in the price and quantity of S&L deposits. While previous empirical research typically treats the risk premium as the key element of deposit interest spread, subsidy-shifting theory suggests that deposit rates also contain a subsidy-shifting premium that arises from an institution’s eagerness to fund loan and investment opportunities that extract deposit-insurance subsidies. This paper examines the existence and the nature of both premiums and shows how regulators can use this information to make regulatory oversight more effective.

This paper develops an optimal resolution triage strategy for a deposit-insurance regulator. The regulator seeks to maximize the market value of the deposit insurance enterprise, subject to budget, personal, bureaucratic, political, informational and legal restraints. Testable hypotheses are derived concerning the timing of insolvency resolutions. The paper tests these hypotheses using a two-step hazards model and a data set of thrift resolutions during 1985–1989. The tests focus on the relative roles of value maximization and constraint pressures in decisions to grant capital forbearance. The results suggest that regulators seldom conformed to the benchmark resolution-timing strategy that an “unconflicted” agent would follow under only a budget constraint. Instead, the evidence shows that the resolution timing decision was distorted by personal, political, informational, and legal constraints.

We examine the monitoring and ex-post influence of depositors on risk-taking of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) from September 1986 to December 2013. As the basis for our empirical analysis, we develop a theoretical model which shows that under risky lending and deposit insurance, a bank’s liability and asset choices are interrelated through its probability of insolvency. Our empirical results are as follows. First, for the sub-sample of the ten largest (Top10) BHCs, deposit risk pricing only exists over some sub-periods prior to the 2007 financial crisis. However, interest rates on insured deposits and uninsured deposits for the Non-Top10 BHCs increase with bank risk over the whole sample period. Moreover, the growth rates of insured and uninsured deposits tend to decrease as bank risk increases for Non-Top10 BHCs over the entire sample period, but only in some sub-periods for the Top10 institutions. Second, although Top10 BHCs do not increase the insured deposits-to-liabilities ratio to weaken market discipline over the entire sample period, all other institutions engage in such regulatory arbitrage in some sub-periods. Third, higher risk premium embedded in current deposit interest rates is more likely to reduce future insolvency risk of troubled BHCs. This suggests that depositors monitor the riskiness of BHCs while also exerting strong ex-post influence on risk-taking of problem institutions. Fourth, in the post-Dodd-Frank Act/Basel III period, the interest rates, the shares, and the growth rate of insured deposits for the Top10 BHCs are significantly negatively related to bank insolvency risk. This could be due to strengthened regulatory oversight on the largest high-risk institutions and is consistent with a substitution relationship between depositor discipline and regulatory oversight.

This paper examines how government ownership and government involvement in a country’s banking system affect bank performance from 1989 through 2004. Our study uncovers an interesting pattern of changing performance differences between state-owned and privately-owned banks around the Asian financial crisis. We find that state-owned banks operated less profitably, held less core capital, and had greater credit risk than privately-owned banks prior to 2001, and the performance differences are more significant in those countries with greater government involvement and political corruption in the banking system. In addition, from 1997 to 2000, the 4-year period after the beginning of the Asian financial crisis, the deterioration in the cash flow returns, core capital, and credit quality of state-owned banks was significantly greater than that of privately-owned banks, especially for the countries that were hardest hit by the Asian crisis. However, state-owned banks closed the gap with privately-owned banks on cash flow returns, core capital, and nonperforming loans in the post-crisis period of 2001–2004. Our findings can best be explained by Shleifer and Vishny’s [Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. J. Finance 52, 737–783] corporate governance theory on state ownership of firms and Kane’s [Kane, E.J., 2000. Capital movement, banking insolvency, and silent runs in the Asian financial crisis. Pacific-Basin Finance J. 8, 153–175] life-cycle model of a regulation-induced banking crisis.

The overwhelming majority of Chinese firms that list their stock both in China and abroad had gone public, and listed, abroad first. We find that when companies listed abroad return to China to issue stock and list, they experience poorer post-issuance stock and operating performance in comparison to purely domestic issuers. Also, they raise more funds relative to their sales, leave less money on the table for investors, and incur lower direct flotation costs. Among returning firms, those which raise higher proceeds relative to sales experience poorer long-run stock performance and lower Tobin’s q post issuance. Our results offer a new perspective on cross-listing, which we term ‘dressing-up-for-premium’. Firms from less-developed markets take advantage of the enhanced visibility and prestige associated with the foreign listing to issue shares domestically at inflated prices and favorable terms, and to raise greater proceeds than they can efficiently use.