This study analyses the effect of political money contributions on U.S. banks’ IPOs. We employ unbalanced panel data of 367 U.S. banks’ IPOs for the period January 1998 to December 2019. Our findings reveal that investors perceive Political Money Contributions (PMC) by U.S. banks as a proxy for political reach and connectedness. We document an inverse relationship between total PMC and the level of underpricing, which implies that both lobbying and PAC expenditure pay off on issue day as donors incur less underpricing. Initial returns decrease with PAC contributions to House of Representatives candidates, whereas the returns relate to the partisan identity of the candidates receiving PAC contributions. We document that those individual contributions by directors bring significant benefits to the IPO banks. Finally, we show that the political contributions of board members, particularly those of CEOs and founders, are associated with better returns in the long term.

This study investigates the imbalance of ESG investing across its environmental (E), social (S), and governance (G) pillars. We find that E plays a more significant role in influencing the imbalance level, and mutual funds prioritize mitigating E risks over S and G risks, which is more pronounced in funds with higher sustainability ratings. Moreover, our findings indicate that investors respond to ESG imbalance, with the level of imbalance showing a negative impact on fund flows, especially for funds with higher sustainability ratings. However, this negative relationship is mitigated as climate change concerns increase. Furthermore, we find that political ideology plays a role in the ESG imbalance, with the imbalance of funds in blue states being more driven by lower environmental considerations compared to those in red states. Additionally, we observe that the ESG imbalance is positively associated with various fund risks. Our study offers implications for policymakers and stakeholders in the asset management industry regarding ESG investing practices.

This study investigates whether regulations have an independent effect on bank risk-taking or whether their effect is channeled through the market power possessed by banks. Given a well-established set of theoretical priors, the regulations considered are capital requirements, restrictions on bank activities and official supervisory power. We use data from the Central and Eastern European banking sectors over the period 1998–2005. The empirical results suggest that banks with market power tend to take on lower credit risk and have a lower probability of default. Capital requirements reduce risk in general, but for banks with market power this effect significantly weakens or can even be reversed. Higher activity restrictions in combination with more market power reduce both credit risk and the risk of default, while official supervisory power has only a direct impact on bank risk.