I assemble and classify a database of judicial reforms funded by foreign aid agencies as either comprehensive (targeting all characteristics of quality, speed, access) or limited reform. A triple difference is used to compare firms in countries with or without judicial reforms, before and after reforms, and in sectors more or less reliant on contract enforcement mechanisms, due to their need for relationship-specific investments. I find that externally financed comprehensive judicial reforms improve perceptions of judiciary efficiency (for all firms) and firm productivity (for sectors relying on relationship-specific investments) by 0.15 and 0.09 (22%) standard deviation, respectively.

France’s 1998 implementation of the 35‐hour workweek has been one of the greatest regulatory shocks on labor markets. Few studies evaluate the impact of this regulation because of a lack of identification strategies. For historical reasons due to the way Alsace‐Moselle was returned to France in 1918, the implementation of France’s 35‐hour workweek was less stringent in that region than in the rest of the country, which is confirmed by double and triple differences. Yet it shows no significant difference in employment with the rest of France, which casts doubt on the effectiveness of this regulation.