Insider transactions are not random across growth and value stocks. We find that insider buying climbs as stocks change from growth to value categories. Insider buying also is greater after low stock returns, and lower after high stock returns. These findings are consistent with a version of overreaction which says that prices of value stocks tend to lie below fundamental values, and prices of growth stocks tend to lie above fundamental values.

Insider transactions are not random across growth and value stocks. We find that insider buying climbs as stocks change from growth to value categories. Insider buying also is greater after low stock returns, and lower after high stock returns. These findings are consistent with a version of overreaction which says that prices of value stocks tend to lie below fundamental values, and prices of growth stocks tend to lie above fundamental values.

The authors examine forty-seven stocks that voluntarily left the American Stock Exchange from 1992 through 1995 and listed on the NASDAQ . They find that both effective and quoted spreads increase by about 100 percent after listing on the NASDAQ. These spread changes are consistent across stocks. In contrast, excess returns are positive when firms announce a switch from the American Stock Exchange to the NASDAQ. The authors are unable to explain this apparent contradiction.

We decompose realized market returns into expected return, unexpected cash-flow news and unexpected discount rate news to test the relation between aggregate market returns and aggregate insider trading. We find that (1) the predictive ability of aggregate insider trading is much stronger than what was reported in earlier studies, (2) aggregate insider trading is strongly related to unexpected cash-flow news, (3) market expectations do not cause insider trading contrary to what others have documented, and (4) aggregate insider trading in firms with high information uncertainty is more likely to be associated with contrarian investment strategy. These results strongly suggest that the predictive ability of aggregate insider trading is because of insider’s ability to predict future cash-flow news rather than from adopting a contrarian investment strategy. These results hold even after we control for non-informative trades and information uncertainty.

We study the aftermarket for 72 initial public offerings (IPOs) using comprehensive trade and quote-change data from every market maker for the first three days of trading. Underwriters quote higher bid prices than other market makers for issues that commence trading at or below the offer price. Underwriters repurchase large quantities of stock in the aftermarket without risk by overselling the issue by the amount of the overallotment option. If the IPO is hot, the overallotment option is exercised. If not, the short position is covered with aftermarket selling. We discuss several reasons for underwriter support.

We examine 47 stocks that voluntarily left the American Stock Exchange from 1992 through 1995 and listed on the Nasdaq. We find that both effective and quoted spreads increase by about 100 percent after listing on the Nasdaq. These spread changes are consistent across stocks. In contrast, excess returns are positive when firms announce a switch from The American Stock Exchange to the Nasdaq. We are unable to explain this apparent contradiction.

We examine 47 stocks that voluntarily left the American Stock Exchange from 1992 through 1995 and listed on the Nasdaq. We find that both effective and quoted spreads increase by about 100 percent after listing on the Nasdaq. These spread changes are consistent across stocks. In contrast, excess returns are positive when firms announce a switch from The American Stock Exchange to the Nasdaq. We are unable to explain this apparent contradiction.