Paul W. Rhode of University of Michigan and NBER reviews “Plagues upon the Earth: Disease and the Course of Human History” by Kyle Harper. The EconLit abstract of this book begins: “Explores the ways that human history has shaped disease ecology and pathogen evolution and how disease ecology and pathogen evolution have shaped human history in turn, detailing how the emergence, incidence, and consequences of disease in both individuals and populations are inseparable from a wider array of social and environmental factors.”

mutation.) Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (henceforth KMR) first provide a useful general theorem concerning the stationary distribution of strategies under Darwinian dynamics. They then divide the analysis of the 2 x 2 game into three cases: dominant strategy games (e.g., prisoners' dilemma), coordination games, and games with no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium (e.g., battle of the sexes). We refer to these as DS, C, and NP games. In each case, KMR claim that, as the rate of mutation vanishes, the stationary distribution of strategies converges to a symmetric Nash equilibrium. They emphasize C games, which have two symmetric Nash equilibria, and characterize the conditions under which the distribution converges to the risk dominant equilibrium. In this note, we argue that while their formal conclusions for C games are correct, their results for DS and NP games are valid only for large populations of players. In small populations, Darwinian dynamics may produce non-Nash outcomes in these two cases. Section 1 summarizes the KMR model, and Section 2 provides examples of 2 x 2 games in which Darwinian dynamics generate non-Nash outcomes. A theorem in Section 3 describes the Darwinian equilibrium of any 2 x 2 game.

This paper investigates the role of induced innovation in the development of American agriculture from 1880 to 1980. The induced innovation hypothesis, most closely associated with the work of Hayami and Ruttan, argues that successful economies develop technologies in accordance with market price signals to loosen constraints on growth imposed by factor scarcities. Our analysis employing new state and regional level data fails to find support for Hayami and Ruttan's hypothesis. This paper suggests that many of the fundamental generalizations about American agricultural development need to be reconsidered and redirects attention to the role of settlement, changing crop patterns, and biological investments in explaining changes in factor utilization in American agriculture.

This paper argues that long-run trends in geographic segregation are inconsistent with models where residential choice depends solely on local public goods (the Tiebout hypothesis). We develop an extension of the Tiebout model that predicts as mobility costs fall, the heterogeneity across communities of individual public good preferences and of public good provision must (weakly) increase. Given the secular decline in mobility costs, these predictions can be evaluated using historical data. We find decreasing heterogeneity in policies and proxies for preferences across (i) a sample of U.S. municipalities (1870–1990); (ii) all Boston-area municipalities (1870–1990); and (iii) all U.S. counties (1850–1990).

From March to July 1933, US industrial production rose 57 percent. We show that an important source of recovery was the effect of dollar devaluation on farm prices, incomes, and consumption. Devaluation immediately raised traded crop prices, and auto sales grew more rapidly in states and counties most exposed to these price increases. The response was amplified in counties with more severe farm debt burdens. For plausible assumptions about farmers’ relative MPC, the incidence of higher farm prices, and the aggregate multiplier, this redistribution to farmers accounted for a substantial portion of spring 1933 growth. This farm channel thus provides an example of how the distributional consequences of macroeconomic policies can have large aggregate effects. That recovery in 1933 benefited from redistribution to farmers suggests an important limitation to the use of 1933 as a guide to the effects of monetary regime changes in other circumstances. (JEL E32, E65, N12, N52, Q11, Q12)

This paper investigates the role of induced innovation in the development of American agriculture from 1880 to 1980. The induced innovation hypothesis, most closely associated with the work of Hayami and Ruttan, argues that successful economies develop technologies in accordance with market price signals to loosen constraints on growth imposed by factor scarcities. Our analysis employing new state and regional level data fails to find support for Hayami and Ruttan's hypothesis. This paper suggests that many of the fundamental generalizations about American agricultural development need to be reconsidered and redirects attention to the role of settlement, changing crop patterns, and biological investments in explaining changes in factor utilization in American agriculture.

Arguing that the beliefs that there were no energy shortages in the US before the 1970s and that large-scale rationing requires government price controls are clearly wrong, the authors analyze the extent of the shortage, the nature of the rationing program, and the structure of the petroleum industry. They argue that regional isolation, industry concentration, and the vertical integration of the larger firms made rationing possible. In the absence of laws requiring rationing or setting prices, they focus on the hypothesis that the oil companies held prices down because they were afraid of hostile government actions. 22 references, 2 figures, 1 table.

Most major American industrial business cycles from around 1880 to the First World War were caused by fluctuations in the size of the cotton harvest due to economically exogenous factors such as weather. Wheat and corn harvests did not affect industrial production; nor did the cotton harvest before the late 1870s. The unique effect of the cotton harvest in this period can be explained as an essentially monetary phenomenon, the result of interactions between harvests, international gold flows, and high-powered money demand under America's goldstandard regime of 1879–1914.

Areas differ in their propensity to experience natural disasters. Exposure to disaster risks can be reduced either through migration (i.e., self-protection) or through public infrastructure investment (e.g., building seawalls). Using migration data from the 1920s and 1930s, this paper studies how the population responded to disaster shocks in an era of minimal public investment. We find that, on net, young men move away from areas hit by tornados but are attracted to areas experiencing floods. Early efforts to protect against future flooding, especially during the New Deal era of the late 1930s, may have counteracted an individual migration response.