This paper provides evidence on the daily market reaction to the announcement and subsequent acceptance or rejection of merger proposals. There is a swift and large positive market reaction to the first public announcement of the merger proposal. Subsequently, there is a positive reaction to the approval of completed proposals and a negative reaction to cancelled proposals. Where proposals are vetoed by incumbent target management, there is a negative market reaction to the veto, but this does not eliminate the earlier positive reaction to the first announcement. In these proposals there is a permanent revaluation of the target shares. This is in contrast to cancelled proposals that incumbent managements do not veto, where the target stock price falls back, on average, to the preproposal level.

This paper provides empirical estimates of the stock market reaction to tender offers, both successful and unsuccessful. The impact of the tender offer on the returns to stockholders of both bidding and target firms is examined. The evidence indicates that for the twelve months prior to the tender offer stockholders of bidding firms earn significant positive abnormal returns. In the month of the offer, only successful bidders earn significant positive abnormal returns. Stockholders of both successful and unsuccessful targe firms earn large positive abnormal returns from tender offers, and most of these returns occur in the month of the offer. For all classes of firms, there is no significant post-offer market reaction. The market reaction to ‘clean-up’ tender offers is also estimated and target stockholders again earn significant positive abnormal returns.

This paper examines a sample of firms experiencing proxy contests for seats on their board of directors. Dissident shareholders usually fail to obtain a majority of board seats. Nevertheless, they capture some seats, via mechanisms such as cumulative voting, in over half of the sample contests. Regardless of proxy contest outcome, positive and statistically significant share price performance is associated with the contest. That finding is predicted by the standard economic analysis of proxy contests, in which the challenges benefit shareholders by improving corporate performance. The finding runs counter to the claim of Berle (1962) that the economists' view of proxy contests is ‘a wholly imaginary picture’. A portion of the positive share price changes taking place in the early stages of some proxy contests is not permanent, however, and as suggested by Manne (1962) is at least partially attributable to temporary increases in the market value of the vote attached to corporate shares.

We investigate whether announcements of ‘subject to’ audit opinions and disclaimers of opinions affect stock prices. The results indicate that many firms experience negative abnormal performance prior to the release of qualified opinions, and that the magnitude of prior abnormal performance differs across types of qualifications. However, there is little evidence of a stock price effect when qualifications are disclosed publicly. It is difficult to construct powerful tests of the announcement effect of a qualified opinion for three reasons. First, the announcement date of the qualification is not easily identified. Second, measuring the unanticipated component of the announcement requires a model of market expectations. Third, controls must be employed for concurrent disclosures. The problems concerning event date identification have ramifications for other accounting event studies, particularly studies of disclosures typically contained in the annual report or 10-K.