This paper extends the application of the bootstrap method in accounting research to a simultaneous equations model of the demand and supply of audit services with mixed qualitative and continuous dependent variables. A moderately sized sample of 118 quality control reviews (Copley, Doucet, and Gaver 1994) is used to demonstrate the bootstrap method and compare results to estimates of standard errors obtained from Amemiya's 1978 asymptotic generalized least squares (GLS) procedure. We find that the GLS t ‐statistics are inflated by as much as 55 percent and the corresponding p ‐values are likewise overstated when compared to the bootstrap results. The problem is more acute with the qualitative dependent variable for audit quality, which is often the key variable of interest.

A cross-sectional analysis of cash compensation paid to CEOs of 713 US firms reveals that the sensitivity of compensation to earnings varies directly with earnings persistence. Additional analysis indicates that this sensitivity is greater for cases where executives are approaching retirement. Such evidence suggests the use of earnings persistence to counterbalance adverse consequences of earnings-based contracting with managers who face finite decision horizons.

Data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth indicate that the employer often pays the explicit costs of not only on‐site training but also off‐site general training. Although few of these costs appear to be passed on to workers in the form of a lower wage while in training, completed spells of general training paid for by previous employers have a larger wage effect than completed spells of general training paid for by the current employer. A model where contract enforcement considerations cause employers to share the costs and returns to purely general training can explain these findings.

"This article utilizes an exact match file between the 1978 March [U.S.] Current Population Survey and administrative records from the Social Security Administration to analyze errors in the reporting of annual income using nonparametric methodology.... Three new findings are of interest: there is higher measurement error in cross-sectional samples than in panels. The negative relationship between measurement error and earnings is driven largely by overreporting among low earners. Median response errors are not related to earnings."

After a very long hiatus, economists have begun again to study the relationship between economics and religion. This article seeks to summarize and evaluate the principal themes and empirical findings that have appeared in some 200 recent papers on the economics of religion. Although some of the research concerns the economic consequences of religiosity, most applies standard economic theory to the study of individual religious activity, the characteristics of religious groups, and the impact of regulation and competition on religious markets.

Fama (1977) and Miller (1977) predict that one minus the corporate tax rate will equate after tax yields from comparable taxable and tax-exempt bonds. Empirical evidence shows that long-term tax-exempt yields are higher than theory predicts. Two popular explanations for this empirical puzzle are that, relative to taxable bonds, municipal bonds bear more default risk and include costly call options. I study U.S. government secured municipal bond yields which are effectively default-free and noncallable. These municipal yields display the same tendency to be too high. I conclude that differential default risk and call options do not explain the municipal bond puzzle.

[Fama (1977) and Miller (1977) predict that one minus the corporate tax rate will equate after-tax yields from comparable taxable and tax-exempt bonds. Empirical evidence shows that long-term tax-exempt yields are higher than theory predicts. Two popular explanations for this empirical puzzle are that, relative to taxable bonds, municipal bonds bear more default risk and include costly call options. I study U.S. government secured municipal bond yields which are effectively default-free and noncallable. These municipal yields display the same tendency to be too high. I conclude that differential default risk and call options do not explain the municipal bond puzzle.]