I examine publicly released annual earnings forecasts issued in conjunction with stock recommendations by mutual fund managers of actively managed open‐end mutual funds. I find that mutual fund manager annual earnings forecasts systematically overestimate the earnings number later disclosed at the annual earnings announcement. In further analyses, I attempt to distinguish between two explanations for this forecast bias: an untruthful reporting bias (market manipulation) and a truthful cognitive bias (optimism). These explanations generate different predictions about the timing of changes in fundholdings of forecasted securities between the forecast release and annual earnings announcement dates. I interpret my findings as more consistent with an optimism explanation for mutual fund manager annual forecast bias and less consistent with a market manipulation explanation for this bias. I am, however, unable to eliminate an unobservable selection bias either in the decision of the mutual fund manager to report a forecast publicly or in the media’s decision to publish that forecast as an explanation for my finding that mutual fund manager forecasts are biased.

We examine if analysts more fully incorporate prior earnings and returns information in their current quarter forecasts as their experience following a firm increases. We measure analyst firm-specific forecasting experience as the number of prior quarters for which the analyst has issued an earnings forecast for the firm. We find that analysts underreact to prior earnings information less as their experience increases, suggesting one reason why analysts become more accurate with experience.

Michael B. Mikhail, Beverly R. Walther, Richard H. Willis, Do Security Analysts Improve Their Performance with Experience?, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 35, Studies on Experts and the Application of Expertise in Accounting, Auditing, and Tax (1997), pp. 131-157

Research concludes that managers’ political orientation influences their decision-making and offers the political connections and risk tolerance hypotheses as explanations. We investigate partisan bias as an additional way political orientation may influence managers’ decisions. Partisan bias results in individuals whose partisan orientation aligns with that of the US president expressing more optimistic economic expectations. We examine whether partisan bias is present in managers’ annual earnings forecasts. We find that firms with CEOs whose partisanship aligns with that of the US president issue more optimistically biased annual earnings forecasts than firms with other CEOs. Higher-ability CEOs, however, are less susceptible to partisan bias. Additionally, we find that overestimating customer demand contributes to the forecast over-optimism of partisan-aligned CEOs and results in greater firm overinvestment. Furthermore, investors fail to discount the news in forecasts of partisan-aligned CEOs, and their firms’ post-forecast abnormal returns are lower.

We investigate whether security analysts exhibit persistence in their stock picking ability. We find that analysts whose recommendation revisions earned the most (least) excess returns in the past continue to outperform (underperform) in the future. Further, the market recognizes these performance differences in the five-day period surrounding the recommendation revision. This market reaction, however, is incomplete. Excess returns in the one and three trading months following the revision are significant and positively associated with analysts’ prior performance. However, a trading strategy taking long (short) positions in recommendation upgrades (downgrades) conditional on analysts’ prior performance is unprofitable.

We examine shareholder litigation and the price and nonprice terms of bank loan contracts. After filing a lawsuit, defendant firms pay higher loan spreads and up-front charges, experience more financial covenants, and are more likely to have a collateral requirement. These findings are consistent with reputational losses associated with shareholder litigation. The magnitude of a firm’s lost market value when the lawsuit is filed is positively related to the increase in the firm’s future borrowing costs. We investigate whether the lawsuit allegations and its merit affect future bank loan terms. Our results do not appear to be affected by self-selection.

Regulators' interest in analyst reports stems from the belief that small investors are unaware of the conflicts sell-side analysts face and may, as a consequence, be misled into making suboptimal investment decisions. We examine who trades on security analyst stock recommendations by extending prior research to focus on investor-specific responses to revisions. We find that both large and small traders react to analyst reports; however, large investors appear to trade more than small traders in response to the information conveyed by the analyst's recommendation and earnings forecast revision (proxied by the magnitudes of the recommendation change and the earnings forecast revision, respectively). We also find that small investors do not fully account for the effects of analysts' incentives on the credibility of analyst reports, as captured by the type of recommendation (i.e., upgrade versus downgrade or buy versus sell). In particular, small investors not only trade more than large investors following upgrade and buy recommendations, but also trade more following upgrade and buy recommendations than they do following downgrade and hold/sell recommendations. Furthermore, we observe that, on average, small traders are net purchasers following recommendation revisions regardless of the type of the recommendation; large traders tend to be net sellers following downgrades and sells. Consequently, large traders generate statistically positive returns from their trading, while small traders generate statistically negative returns from their trading. These findings are consistent with large investors being more sophisticated processors of information, and provide some support for regulators' concerns that analysts may more easily mislead small investors.