Journal Article Fluctuations in Capital and the Demand for Money Get access S. P. Chambers S. P. Chambers London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 2, Issue 1, October 1934, Pages 38–50, https://doi.org/10.2307/2967549 Published: 01 October 1934
A Contribution to the Theory of Price Fluctuations J. B. S. Haldane, F.R.S. J. B. S. Haldane, F.R.S. London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 1, Issue 3, June 1934, Pages 186–195, https://doi.org/10.2307/2967482 Published: 01 June 1934
The Review of Economics and Statistics193416(1), 8
pRACTICALLY all of the economists who have published serious discussions of the relation between gold or prosperity and prices have specifically stated that the general price level is not identical with the average of wholesale prices, still less with any single index of wholesale prices.2 Having made this admission they have proceeded to argue to conclusions that can be justified only on the assumption that the general price level is adequately represented by the Sauerbeck or some other wholesale index.
The Review of Economics and Statistics193416(4), 80
ECONOMIC crises and depressions are primarily social products. In the complex process by which they are brought about, Nature often plays a significant part. The major responsibility, however, rests on men, through multifarious private actions and numerous public policies. Of course, no individual, group, or government strives to bring on a crisis or depression. Rather with motives of private gain and public good appraisals, forecasts, and commitments are made, and actions taken, which give rise to a condition of more or less serious disequilibrium. Major crises and severe depressions commonly result from the unfortunate conjuncture of a considerable number of disproportionately developed or internally weak situations, often not previously recognized as such. The severity of the crisis, and the depth and duration of the depression, largely depend upon the number of parts of the economic structure in which serious weakness exists, and the difficulty with which such weaknesses can be corrected and adjustments made to the whole. Among the distinguishable parts of the economic machine in which fallacious ideas, erroneous appraisals, mistaken forecasts, and ill-judged actions may create an unbalanced condition, the positions of great staples of production, trade, and consumption are important. The intricate task of analyzing the factors responsible for the occurrence and intensity of crisis, recession, and depression, and the factors that hamper or promote recovery, requires the services of students of commodity economies. Such services in particular cases are needed in the formulation of adequate general theories of economic conjuncture.1 With this objective I present here, with interpretations, some salient facts regarding one great staple, with special reference to the crisis and depression of I929-34.2 Wheat is a basic food product, the preferred if not invariably the principal cereal in the diet of most of the population of what may be called the commercial world. It is grown by millions of farmers, over a large part of the agricultural world. It is a major source of income for large agricultural groups. Its price has a powerful influence on prices of other grains and of farm land, thereby affecting much larger agricultural groups. The income of these groups is a dominant factor in the volume of business and income of various non-farming groups. In volume and in value, wheat is one of the most important commodities entering into domestic and international trade. Its movement therefore vitally affects commercial transportation interests, and its price is of vital concern to speculative and financial interests. It is, moreover, prominent among the commodities with which national policies have dealt. In this latest major recession and depression, which has been notably severe in agriculture,3
Abstract The article focuses on the Clark Plan of retail accounting. In March, 1934, the Board of Directors of the National Retail Dry Goods Association voted favorably on the adoption of the Clark Plan, embodying what have been called radical changes in Retail Accounting. The plan as finally adopted is not as radical a departure from present methods as was the original plan proposed by a controller, Carlos B. Clark. While the Clark Plan is optional, every inducement will be made to have stores adopt it. Since the Clark Plan is thought by some to be a revolution in retail accounting, comparing in importance with the adoption of the retail inventory system some years ago, accountants and particularly teachers of accounting should be somewhat familiar with it. The following comments, while not an exhaustive treatment of the subject should serve to clear up some misconceptions and also to define some of the issues involved. The effect upon business generally of recent laws and administrative policies of the government at Washington D.C. has been far-reaching.
Abstract A course in accounting systems is usually offered by a university which permits students to specialize in accounting. The subject, "Accounting Systems," is at the same time one of the most difficult and the most valuable that the student specializing in accounting is called upon to master. Its difficulty and also its value lies not so much in its content as in its method. A good course in accounting systems is perhaps the most rigorous and comprehensive test to which a student's knowledge of accounting principles may be subjected. From the standpoint of methods followed in teaching accounting systems, there are no doubt many approaches in present use. No study has been made, in so far as is known, of the methods pursued in teaching courses in accounting systems in the various schools of business. In the opinion of the author, however, there are at least three possible approaches. In the first place, one may present the subject as a course in methodology. That is, from the standpoint of the method which should be followed by an accountant in undertaking the preliminary investigation and subsequent installation of an accounting system.
The Review of Economics and Statistics193416(6), 129
T HIS discussion aims to indicate the implications, concerning the major consequences of the N.R.A., of selected broad statistical measurements of various factors in the business situation. Even under ordinary circumstances one cannot with assurance outline the causal connections between particular economic events or policies and the concurrent or subsequent course of business as revealed in statistics. In attempting to interpret these statistics, therefore, we must bear constantly in mind that some of the observed movements may be due to causes, natural or official, quite unrelated to the N.R.A. The main outlines are, however, so distinct that it seems safe to present tentative conclusions concerning certain chief consequences of the N.R.A. The discussion will be confined to fairly general aspects of the situation. Even if it were desirable to study the detailed effects of the N.R.A. upon numerous small or local industrial operations, significant statistics would not be available. As a matter of fact, it is clear that there is now in high places a realization, somewhat belated but very welcome, that the N.R.A. procedure, whatever the chance of its success for large industries operating on a national scale, encounters insuperable obstacles when applied to local enterprises.
1. The Bank of England Operations, 1931–33, 471. — 2. The over-valued pound, 475. — 3. The theory of the British Exchange Equalization Fund, 478. — 4. The operation of the British Exchange Equalization Fund, 482. — 5. British and foreign prices and costs, 485. — 6. The export bounty, 493. — 7. Prices of imports and the balance of payments, 502.