ABSTRACT We investigate whether recognition on the face of the financial statements versus disclosure in the footnotes influences the amount that financial managers report for a contingent liability. Using an experiment with corporate controllers and chief financial officers, we find that financial managers in public companies expend more cognitive effort and exhibit less strategic bias under recognition than disclosure. This difference appears to be associated with capital market pressures experienced by public company managers as we find that both the cognitive effort and bias exhibited by private company managers are unaffected by placement. As a result, public company managers make higher liability estimates for recognized versus disclosed liabilities. Their liability estimates are similar to those of private company managers for recognition but lower than private company managers’ estimates for disclosure. Our results have implications for auditors and financial statement users in evaluating recognized versus disclosed information for public and private companies.

ABSTRACT: This research investigates how financial statement users' judgments and decisions are affected by the extent to which a firm's actual accounting choices match users' expectations. Based on prior communications research, I predict and find that users' credibility judgments are more extreme when a firm's actual accounting choices do not match expectations. Experiment 1 supports this prediction in a stock-based compensation context, and Experiment 2 supports it in an accounting estimate context. Further, evidence from Experiment 1 supports the prediction that credibility judgments mediate the effect of a mismatch on investment decisions. Finally, evidence from Experiment 2 partially supports the prediction that users who encounter a mismatch between actual and expected accounting choices are more likely to search for additional information than are users who encounter a match. The results have implications for accounting researchers, regulators, and managers interested in understanding how firms' accounting choices affect users' decisions.

ABSTRACT This paper examines interpretation of accounting standards that provide implementation guidance via affirmative or counter examples. Based on prior psychology research, we predict that practitioners engage in “example‐based reasoning” such that they are more likely to conclude that their case qualifies for the same treatment as the example. We test our predictions in two experiments in which participants judge the appropriateness of income‐statement recognition. Experiment 1 uses Masters of Business Administration (MBA) students and varies example type (affirmative, counter) and case (revenue recognition, expense recognition) in a 2 × 2 design. Experiment 1 supports our predictions. Experiment 2 uses more experienced practitioners, and varies example type (affirmative, counter, both) in a 1 × 3 design. Experiment 2 supports the use of example‐based reasoning, and indicates that practitioners in the “both” condition respond as if they had only received an affirmative example. These results have implications for understanding how guidance that accompanies accounting standards can result in aggressive or conservative application of standards.

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Hybrid financial instruments contain features of both liabilities and equity. Standard setters continue to struggle with “getting the classification right” for these complex instruments. In this paper, we experimentally test whether the features of hybrid instruments affect the credit-related judgments of experienced finance professionals, even when the hybrid instruments are already classified as liabilities or equity. Our results suggest that getting the classification right is not of primary importance for these experienced users, as they largely rely on the underlying features of the instrument to make their judgments. A second experiment shows that experienced users’ reliance on features generalizes to several features that often characterize hybrid instruments. However, we also find that experienced users vary in their beliefs about which individual features are most important in distinguishing between liabilities and equity. Together, our results highlight the importance of effective disclosure of hybrid instruments’ features.

ABSTRACT Current financial reporting guidance allows managers flexibility as to whether to disaggregate income statement items. Such flexibility is problematic if managers prefer to aggregate in some situations and disaggregate in others because we conjecture that investors' evaluations of firms will predictably differ depending on whether performance information is shown in an aggregated or disaggregated fashion. We conduct a series of related experiments within the context of compound financial instruments to investigate whether managers' preferences follow the predictions of mental accounting theory; specifically, that presentation preferences vary as a function of the sign and relative magnitude of the income statement items. Results reveal that managers' disaggregation preferences reflect mental accounting. Further, the effects of mental accounting are moderated only when managers feel high pressure to report transparently. Finally, and most importantly, the preferred presentations of managers result in the highest firm valuations from investors, indicating that investors also rely on mental accounting. Our study has implications for standard setters, regulators, and researchers.

ABSTRACT We examine how information dissemination via mobile device applications (apps) affects nonprofessional investors' judgments. In response to the prevalence of mobile device use, the media ungroups content into smaller pieces to accommodate users, and apps use push notifications to highlight this content. These changes increase users' ability to access investment information in real time, leaving some investors feeling as if they are missing out if they are not continuously connected. We validate a scale to capture investors' fear of missing out on investment information (I-FoMO) and document that I-FoMO is distinct from traditional FoMO that occurs in social settings. Then, using an experiment, we find that receiving ungrouped content via a mobile device has a greater effect on investment allocations in the presence, rather than absence, of push notifications. Further, we find that these results hold for higher, but not for lower, I-FoMO investors. JEL Classifications: G23; M41; M48; M49. Data Availability: Contact the authors.