ABSTRACT In December 1999, the SEC instituted a new listing standard for NYSE and NASDAQ firms. Listed firms were now required to maintain fully independent audit committees with at least three members. In July 2002, the U.S. Congress legislated these standards through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Our research question is whether all investors benefited from the 1999 new rule. Using both an event study and a difference-in-differences methodology, we find no evidence of higher market value or better financial reporting quality resulting from this rule.

Accounting Standards Update (ASU) 2016‐01 requires that unrealized gains and losses on equity investments (equity‐URGL) previously recognized in other comprehensive income now be included in net income. Using a sample of public insurers, we examine how this accounting standard change influences managerial investment decisions, with a particular focus on the moderating effects of compensation contracting and financial reporting practices. We find that prior to ASU 2016‐01, equity‐URGL was positively associated with CEO compensation, but this association dissipates in the post‐adoption period, when equity‐URGL is more frequently excluded from CEO performance metrics. Despite purported concerns about increased earnings volatility due to the new reporting requirements, highly affected insurers do not significantly reduce the size or risk of their equity investment portfolios following ASU 2016‐01, particularly when compensation metrics exclude equity‐URGL. We also find that equity‐URGL is more frequently excluded from non‐GAAP earnings post‐adoption, suggesting that managers adjust financial reporting practices as a response to the change. Moreover, highly affected insurers maintain the size and risk of their equity portfolios when equity‐URGL is excluded from non‐GAAP earnings. These findings suggest that managerial responses to ASU 2016‐01 are influenced by a balance between incentive structures and the costs associated with adjusting investment strategies.

We examine the effects of the 1998 merger of Price Waterhouse ( PW ) and Coopers & Lybrand ( CL ) on the audit quality of the merged firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) at both the firm and office levels, where audit quality is surrogated by the auditor's propensity to issue a going‐concern opinion, clients’ likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts, and clients’ accrual quality. At the firm level, we find that the merger increased audit quality for PwC relative to the audit quality of the other Big N firms. At the office level, our findings, albeit mixed, collectively suggest that the improvement in firm‐level audit quality was likely driven by the improvement in audit quality at PwC's overlapping offices, that is, offices in cities where both PW and CL had separate offices prior to the merger. Further, our findings suggest that although the PW / CL merger increased auditor concentration in local audit markets with PwC overlapping offices, the merger improved (rather than hurt) audit quality in those markets. Overall, our study contributes to the extant sparse literature on the effect of Big N mergers on audit quality, and is of potential interest to regulators.

ABSTRACT We examine economic consequences of U.S. bank regulators' phased removal of the prudential filter for accumulated other comprehensive income for advanced approaches banks beginning on January 1, 2014. The primary effect of the AOCI filter is to exclude unrealized gains and losses on available-for-sale securities from banks' regulatory capital. We predict and find that, to mitigate regulatory capital volatility resulting from the filter removal, advanced approaches banks increased the proportion of investment securities classified as held-to-maturity, thereby limiting their financing and interest rate risk management options, and they decreased securities risk, thereby reducing their interest rate spread. We further predict and find that these banks borrow more under securities repurchase agreements potentially collateralized by held-to-maturity securities and reduce loan supply owing to their reduced financing options, and that they increase loan risk to mitigate the decrease in their interest rate spread. JEL Classifications: G21; G28; M41; M48. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

ABSTRACT We provide evidence that banks classify fixed-rate debt investment securities as held to maturity (HTM) rather than as available for sale (AFS) when HTM classification provides preferred financial accounting and regulatory capital treatments, not because they have a distinct economically motivated intent and ability to hold the securities to maturity. Specifically, we document predictably divergent security classifications by three categories of banks that differ in whether the regulatory accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI) filter, which removes AOCI from Tier 1 capital, applies in four subperiods of our 2012–2022 sample period. The boundaries of the subperiods reflect changes in the AOCI filter’s applicability in 2014 and 2019 and the sharp rise in interest rates beginning in late 2021. We further find that the bank categories differ in the interest rate risk of their AFS securities and the extents to which they economically hedge that risk using derivatives and uninsured deposits. JEL Classifications: G21; G28; M41; M48.

ABSTRACT We examine whether board demographic diversity enhances cognitive diversity (measured as director dissent in the boardroom) and monitoring. At the director level, we find that individual directors who are dissimilar relative to other board members in terms of tenure and experience are more likely to dissent. At the board level, boards composed of directors who have heterogenous tenure, experience, and gender are more likely to dissent. We also find that stock market reactions to director resignation announcements are more negative for directors who have ever dissented than for other directors. Moreover, following dissent-driven proposal rejections, firms experience an improvement in value and internal governance and a decrease in risk. The results suggest that directors who have diverse qualifications and skillsets as well as the inclusion of female directors enhance cognitive diversity, and that this enhanced cognitive diversity helps increase firm value and monitoring effectiveness. JEL Classifications: G30; G32; G34.

ABSTRACT We examine whether the adoption of the current expected credit losses (CECL) model, which incorporates forward-looking information in loan loss provisions (LLPs), enhances banks’ information production. Consistent with better information production, we document significant changes in both financial reporting and operational outcomes following CECL adoption. First, CECL banks’ LLPs become timelier and better reflect future local economic conditions. Second, CECL banks experience lower rates of loan defaults. These improvements are more pronounced among banks that invest more in CECL-related information systems and human capital, and are especially salient for larger banks. Our findings suggest that forward-looking accounting standards can enhance banks’ information environments. JEL Classifications: E32; G2; G28; M4; M48.