I exploit the leveraged exchange-traded funds’ (ETFs’) primary market to measure aggregate, uninformed, gambling-like demand, that is, speculation sentiment. The leveraged ETFs’ primary market is a novel setting that provides observable arbitrage activity attributed to correcting mispricing between ETFs’ shares and their underlying assets. The arbitrage activity proxies for the magnitude and direction of speculative demand shocks and I use them to form the Speculation Sentiment Index. The measure negatively relates to contemporaneous market returns (e.g., it is bullish in down markets) and negatively predicts returns. The results are consistent with speculation sentiment causing market-wide price distortions that later reverse.

We provide evidence that investors with leverage constraints demand leverage for the sake of leverage. We study the equity closed-end fund (CEF) market and document a strong positive relation between fund leverage and CEF premiums, indicating that investors pay a relative premium for leverage. We perform a quasi-natural experiment and identify leverage as a causal driver of the premium. Leverage changes do not signal improved fund performance. Instead, the only benefit to investors of increased leverage is amplified exposure via greater volatility and risk exposure. We supply external validity by relating our results to the betting-against-beta factor.

A divestment campaign aims to depress share prices to induce managers to change firm behavior. Assuming that managers make profit-maximizing decisions in the absence of a campaign, firms that accede to divestors’ demands raise short-run share prices but depress long-run profits. Managers who are more interested in short-run prices are therefore more motivated by divestment than managers who care about long-run profits. We show that, as most managerial compensation contracts reward long-run profitability and stock returns, divestment can be ineffective at best, and perhaps counterproductive, rewarding managers who attract divestment campaigns. In a quantification exercise, we show that the wealth of most executives running likely divestment targets in 2015 would be unaffected by even large movements in share prices. Of those affected, a substantial majority would benefit from divestment.

We consider a model of active asset management in which mutual fund managers exert unobservable effort to earn excess returns. Investors allocate capital to actively managed funds and passively managed products. In equilibrium, investors are indifferent between investing an additional dollar with an active manager or with a passively managed product. As passively managed products become more attractive to investors, active managers’ revenues from portfolio-management services fall, reducing their effort incentives. More-severe decreasing-returns-to-scale are also associated with reduced incentives and increased moral hazard. Performance-based fees and holdings-based data are all unlikely to mitigate moral hazard.

We analyze early-venture fundraising from dispersed, endogenously informed investors. An entrepreneur chooses a payoff-maximizing offering, and investors communicate their information by either contributing capital or abstaining. The entrepreneur uses the information conveyed by fundraising amounts to decide whether or not to undertake a risky venture. His decision threshold hedges investors against bad projects, creating a “loser’s blessing” that encourages contributing without information. Making the offering less attractive to investors mitigates the loser’s blessing but can give rise to a winner’s curse. Both tensions reduce financing efficiency.

We study joint financing between profit-motivated and socially motivated (impact) investors and derive conditions under which impact investments improve social outcomes. When project owners cannot commit to social objectives, impact investors hold financial claims to counterbalance owners’ tendencies to overemphasize profits. Impact investors’ ownership stakes are higher when the value of social output is higher, and pure nonprofit status may be optimal for the highest valued social projects. We provide guidance about the design of contingent social contracts, such as social impact bonds and social impact guarantees.Received May 23, 2016; editorial decision April 28, 2018 by Editor Francesca Cornelli.

Non-fundamental demand shocks have significant effects on asset prices, but observing these shocks is challenging. We use the exchange-traded fund (ETF) primary market to study non-fundamental demand. Unique to the ETF market, specialized arbitrageurs called authorized participants correct violations of the law of one price between an ETF and its underlying assets by creating or redeeming ETF shares. We show theoretically and empirically that creation and redemption activities (ETF flows) provide signals of non-fundamental demand shocks. A portfolio that is short high-flow ETFs and long low-flow ETFs earns excess returns of 1.1–2.0% per month, consistent with non-fundamental demand distorting asset prices away from fundamental values. Moreover, we show non-fundamental demand imposes non-trivial costs on investors, leading to underperformance.

We analyze a setting in which a board must hire a chief executive officer (CEO) after exerting effort to learn about the quality of each candidate. Optimal effort is asymmetric, implying asymmetric likelihoods of each candidate being chosen. If the board has an infinitesimal bias in favor of one candidate, it allocates effort to maximize the likelihood of that candidate being chosen. Even when the board's prior is that its preferred candidate is inferior, she may still be chosen most often. A glass ceiling can also arise whereby the tendency to hire favored candidates increases as the importance of the position increases.