This paper investigates employment effects of the Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing policies (QE) via a bank lending channel. We find that banks with higher mortgage-backed securities holdings refinanced relatively more mortgages after the first round of QE, which increased local consumption and employment in the nontradable goods sector. In contrast, banks increased lending to firms and home purchase mortgage origination after the third round of QE, which led to a sizable increase in overall employment. Our findings are supported by new confidential loan-level data that show firms with stronger ties to affected banks increased employment and capital investment more during QE3.

We present a model in which intermediaries create liquidity by issuing safe debt. Two types of intermediaries emerge: Traditional banks that create liquidity by issuing equity and holding assets to maturity, and market-based intermediaries that create liquidity by selling assets in fire sales in downturns. We show that the reliance on market-based intermediation is necessarily too high, but liquidity creation is not. It can also be too low as the endogenous fire-sale risk can push liquidity creation below its optimum. We argue that standard capital or liquidity regulation are ineffective, and optimal macroprudential regulation should instead target market-based intermediation.

Abstract We study the valuation of collateral by comparing spreads on loans by the same bank, to the same borrower, at the same origination date, but backed by different types of collateral. Pledging collateral reduces borrowing costs by 23 BPS on average. The effect varies across different types of collateral, with marketable securities being most valuable, and real estate and accounts receivables and inventory being more valuable than fixed assets and a blanket lien. Further, the rate reduction from pledging collateral is sensitive to the value of the underlying collateral, and collateral tends to be more valuable for smaller and private firms and for loans with longer maturity.

Abstract We study the run on the German banking system in 1931 to understand whether depositors anticipate which banks will fail in a major financial crisis. We find that deposits decline by around 20% during the run. There is an equal outflow of retail and nonfinancial wholesale deposits from both failing and surviving banks. In contrast, we find that interbank deposits almost exclusively decline for failing banks. Our evidence suggests that banks are better informed about which fellow banks will fail. In turn, banks being informed allows the interbank market to continue providing liquidity even during times of severe financial distress.

Abstract Why do banks fail? We create a panel covering most commercial banks from 1863 through 2024 to study the history of failing banks in the United States. Failing banks are characterized by rising asset losses, deteriorating solvency, and an increasing reliance on expensive noncore funding. These commonalities imply that bank failures are highly predictable using simple accounting metrics from publicly available financial statements. Failures with runs were common before deposit insurance, but these failures are strongly related to weak fundamentals, casting doubt on the importance of non-fundamental runs. Furthermore, low recovery rates on failed banks’ assets suggest that most failed banks subject to runs were fundamentally insolvent, barring large value destruction of receiverships. Altogether, our evidence suggests that the primary cause of bank failures and banking crises is almost always and everywhere a deterioration of bank fundamentals.

Using confidential loan officer survey data on lending standards and internal risk ratings on loans, we document an effect of large-scale asset purchase programs (LSAPs) on lending standards and risk-taking. We exploit cross-sectional variation in banks’ holdings of mortgage-backed securities to show that the first and third round of quantitative easing (QE1 and QE3) significantly lowered lending standards and increased loan risk characteristics. The magnitude of the effects is about the same in QE1 and QE3, and is comparable to the effect of a one percentage point decrease in the Fed funds target rate.

We use supervisory loan-level data to document that small firms (SMEs) obtain shorter maturity credit lines than large firms, post more collateral, have higher utilization rates, and pay higher spreads. We rationalize these facts as the equilibrium outcome of a trade-off between lender commitment and discretion. Using the COVID recession, we test the prediction that SMEs are subject to greater lender discretion. Consistent with this hypothesis, SMEs did not draw down whereas large firms did, even in response to similar demand shocks. PPP recipients reduced non-PPP loan balances, indicating the program bolstered their liquidity and alleviated the shortfall.

This paper studies how a large increase in the price level is transmitted to the real economy through firm balance sheets. Using newly digitized macro- and micro-level data from the German inflation of 1919–1923, we show inflation led to a large reduction in real debt burdens and bankruptcies. Firms with higher nominal liabilities at the onset of inflation experienced a larger decline in interest expenses, a relative increase in their equity values, and higher employment during the inflation. The results are consistent with real effects of a debt-inflation channel that operates even when prices and wages are flexible. (JEL D22, E23, E31, G32, N14, N24)

How does banking competition affect credit provision and growth? How does it affect financial stability? In order to identify the causal effects of banking competition, we exploit a discontinuity in bank capital requirements during the nineteenth-century National Banking Era. We show that banks operating in markets with lower entry barriers extend more credit. The resulting credit expansion, in turn, is associated with additional real economic activity. However, banks in markets with lower entry barriers also take more risk and are more likely to default. Thus, we provide causal evidence that banking competition can cause both growth and financial instability.

ABSTRACT Corporate credit lines are drawn more heavily when funding markets are stressed. This elevates expected bank funding costs. We show that credit supply is dampened by the associated debt‐overhang cost to bank shareholders. Until 2022, this impact was reduced by linking the interest paid on lines to a credit‐sensitive reference rate like the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR). We show that transition to risk‐free reference rates may exacerbate this friction. The adverse impact on credit supply is offset if drawdowns are expected to be deposited at the same bank, which happened at some of the largest banks during the global financial crisis and COVID recession.