When subject matter experts are consulted during an audit, the quality of the expert's advice depends upon their ability to fully understand and incorporate client‐specific facts into their advice. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection reports suggest that auditors are neglecting to perform the required work to assess the quality of experts' recommendations. This study examines how characteristics of the audit, notably staffing decisions, can impede auditors' ability to discern advice quality. In an experiment, we examine how receiving advice of different levels of quality (lower or higher incorporation of relevant client facts) and awareness at the planning stage of the use of a subject matter expert (a priori aware or unaware) impacts auditors' effort, utilization of the advice, and judgment accuracy. We find that awareness of an expert being employed led to a social facilitation effect such that auditors who were a priori aware put forth more effort prior to receiving the expert advice and were initially in less agreement with management's aggressive revenue recognition position than auditors who were unaware. Upon receiving the expert advice, auditors who were a priori aware were more accurate than auditors who were unaware. These results should interest both audit regulators and practitioners by demonstrating how the timing and communication of consulting decisions affect auditors' assessments of advice received from subject matter experts.

Concerns over “revolving door” practices of companies hiring directly from their external auditor led to a Sarbanes-Oxley Act provision mandating a one-year cooling-off period before such hires can occur. Yet little is known as to whether these alumni affiliations, still prevalent today, actually impair audit quality. Drawing on Social Identity Theory, we conduct an experiment to examine whether auditors experience heightened identification with an alumni-affiliated client manager and, if so, how this perceived relationship affects their professional skepticism in response to a management persuasion attempt. As predicted, absent the use of a management persuasion tactic, auditors identify more with an alumni-affiliated manager than a non-alumnus with equal professional experience, and this perceived social bond enhances the manager's influence. However, the use of a common persuasion tactic, while effective at influencing auditor judgment when used by an unaffiliated manager, “backfires” when used by an alumni-affiliated manager, leading to diminished persuasion and increased professional skepticism. Evidence suggests that auditors are better able to identify the inappropriateness of the persuasion attempt when the tactic is used by an alumni-affiliated manager.